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Abstract 
 The Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements diverge in terms of their structural 
nature; for example, Flemish nationalism developed as a Christian democratic movement, 
whereas contemporary Québécois nationalism was galvanized around a secular-leftist 
ideology. There is also a significant contrast in the socio-demographic, economic, and political 
realities of Flanders in Belgium compared to those of Québec in Canada. However, despite the 
differing influences on the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, they have 
developed and maintained very similar nationalist profiles. Both nationalist movements are 
defined by a sense of ethno-linguistic distinctness, both have a paralleling nationalist discourse 
focused on the need to preserve and protect the language and culture of the national 
community, and both have been focused on obtaining a redistribution of cultural and political 
power through constructing an alternative political structure from that of the federal state.  
 This thesis proposes that the mirroring nationalist profiles of the Flemish and 
Québécois nationalist movements can be traced to the development of a similar type of ethno-
linguistic nationalism of protest, which was initially established by nationalists wanting to 
rectify the effects of a linguistically based ‘cultural division of labour’. As a means of 
instrumentalizing and perpetuating this sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, both 
Flemish and Québécois nationalists have relied on evocating and shaping key ‘shared 
memories’ found within the historical narrative of the national community. These shared 
memories, as well as their symbolic representations, reflect sentiments of struggle, injustice, 
and victimization, and have been vital for Flemish and Québécois nationalists in maintaining 
their paralleling expressions of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest in Flanders and in 
Québec. 
 
Keywords: Flanders, Flemish, Québec, Québécois, cultural division of labour, ethno-
linguistic, nations, nationalism, nationalism of protest, nationalist movement, shared 
memoires, symbols.  
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Résumé 
 Les mouvements nationalistes flamands et québécois divergent en concernant leur 
structure; par exemple le nationalisme flamand s'est développé comme un mouvement 
chrétien-démocrate, alors que le nationalisme québécois contemporain s’est galvanisé autour 
d'une idéologie laïque de gauche. Par ailleurs, il existe un contraste entre les poids 
sociodémographique, politique et économique portés par la région de Flandres en Belgique, et 
ceux portés dans la province du Québec au Canada. 
 Cependant, malgré les influences divergentes structurelles et systémiques, les 
mouvements nationalistes flamand et québécois ont développé et maintenu des profils très 
similaires. Par exemple, les deux mouvements nationalistes se définissent par une distinction 
ethnolinguistique, les deux ont un discours nationaliste parallèle axé sur la nécessité de 
préserver et de protéger la langue et la culture de la communauté nationale, et les deux se 
concentrent sur l'obtention d'une redistribution des pouvoirs culturels et politiques.  
 Dans ce mémoire, nous proposons que le profil nationaliste ressemblant du mouvement 
nationaliste flamand et québécois puisse être expliqué par le développement d'un « 
nationalisme ethnolinguistique de contestation », qui était initialement mis en place par les 
nationalistes flamands et québécois cherchant à corriger les effets d'une « division culturelle 
du travail ». Ce sentiment d’un nationalisme de contestation ethnolinguistique est 
instrumentalisé et perpétué par les nationalistes flamands et québécois en évoquant certains « 
souvenirs partagés », qui sont trouvés dans le récit historique de la communauté nationale. Ces 
souvenirs partagés, ainsi que leurs représentations symboliques, reflètent les sentiments de 
protestation, injustice et victimisation, qui sont vitaux pour les nationalistes flamands et 
québécois dans le maintien de leur expression parallèlement à un nationalisme de contestation 
ethnolinguistique en Flandres et au Québec. 
 
Mots clés : Flandre, Flamand, Québec, Québécois, division culturelle du travail, 
ethnolinguistique, nations, nationalisme, nationalisme de contestation, mouvement 
nationaliste, souvenirs partagés, symbolisme. 
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Introduction 
There is debate among social scientists regarding the exact point in history that marks 
the emergence of nationalism. However, there is virtually universal acceptance that 
nationalism is a modern phenomenon that came to the forefront as a tangible movement and 
ideology in the latter half of the eighteenth century.
1
 Today, nationalism maintains an 
unassailable position in the world as an extremely influential socio-political force. But what 
does the term nationalism denote, and how can we identify it?  
John Breuilly underlines the vagueness that exists when defining nationalism, 
explaining that the term can be used to refer to ideas, sentiments, or actions.
2
 For other 
scholars, such as Elie Kedourie, nationalism has been viewed as a ‘doctrine’,3 while Anthony 
Smith sees it as an ideological movement,
4
 and according to Ernst Gellner, nationalism can be 
categorized as a political principle.
5
 In light of nationalism’s broad nature, an analysis of a 
‘nationalist movement’ is arguably better suited to address the empirically observable activity 
of individuals who utilize nationalism as a political ideology and means of social organization, 
in an effort to obtain their specific goals and demands.
6
  
Within a community, a nationalist movement gains adherents when it is able to build 
upon a sense of social solidarity and collective identity, which is based on objective criteria 
such as ethnicity and culture (objective in that it is the community itself that establishes the 
parameters defining ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’). These ideals of social solidarity and collective 
identity are translated into a sense of national membership, and are the galvanizing force 
behind national movements.
7
 Today, nationalist movements continue to have a profound 
influence in shaping the social and political landscapes of societies around the world. This is 
especially true for those societies having nationalist movements of stateless nations; and this 
fact is exemplified in the Belgian region of Flanders and in the Canadian province of Québec, 
where the respective Flemish (or Vlaams in Dutch) and Québécois nationalist movements have 
become integral parts of the socio-political culture. 
                                                          
1 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (New York: Routledge, 1998), 1.  
2 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 404. 
3 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 1. 
4 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), 51. 
5 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 1. 
6 Miroslav Hroch, “Real and Constructed: the nature of the nation,” in The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory 
of Nationalism, edited by John A. Hall (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 92. 
7 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalist Movements (London: The MacMillan Press, 1976), 15. 
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 The Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements were founded on similar principles 
of ethno-linguistic nationalism, and both have been historically focused on the objective of 
reversing socio-economic inequalities by establishing a political structure geared towards 
redistributing cultural and political power.
8
 More specifically, the nationalist projects in 
Flanders and Québec have both successfully established political institutions within their 
respective sub-state political structures, which embody the ideal of an ethno-linguistic and 
territorially linked conception of the nation. Furthermore, both the Flemish and Québécois 
nationalist movements have a commonality in terms of the factors that acted as a catalyst for 
their development. Both movements can be viewed as a struggle for cultural and linguistic 
recognition, which had initially been sought-after as a means of overcoming obstacles to social 
mobility—specifically, a linguistically defined ‘cultural division of labour’.9 And although the 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have unique historical narratives, they 
developed into a full-fledged socio-political force within their respective societies around the 
same time.
10
 In fact, both the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements today are very 
similar in terms of their discourse regarding their cultural (notably linguistic) and political 
objectives. We refer to this specific discourse defining the characteristics of the cultural 
politics of the nationalist movements in sum as being the ‘nationalist profile’.  
 Interestingly, however, the similarities between the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements are present despite key structural differences, including diverging ideological 
perspectives and economic principles, as well as a contrasting role and influence of the 
Catholic Church.
11
 Furthermore, there are clear differences between the region of Flanders and 
the province of Québec, namely in terms of demographics, economic strength, geography, and 
political organization. For example, out of a population of eleven million, the Dutch-speaking 
Flemish make up the largest linguistic group in Belgium (59 percent), and out of the three 
Belgian regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital), the Dutch-speaking region of 
Flanders is the biggest in terms of geographic size and population (6.08 million), as well as 
                                                          
8 Jan Erk, “Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du 
nationalisme québécois,” Recherches Sociographiques 43, no. 3 (2002): 503. 
9 Ibid., 505. 
10 Eric Vanneufville, Le coq et le lion : La Belgique à la croisée des chemins (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1998), 86; 
Raphaël Canet, Nationalismes et Société au Québec (Outremount: Athéna éditions, 2003), 174.    
11 Jan Erk, “Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du 
nationalisme québécois,” Recherches Sociographiques 43, no. 3 (2002): 500. 
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being the strongest economically.
12
 Conversely, only around 22.1 percent of Canada’s 
population of 34 million count themselves as Francophones. The majority (91.2 percent) 
reside in Québec, which is the largest province in terms of geographic size but is only one of 
ten provinces in Canada (there are also three Northern territories), with almost all of the other 
provinces being predominantly English-speaking (New Brunswick, Canada’s only officially 
bilingual province, being a notable exception).
13
 Moreover, despite being the province with 
the second largest population, Québec’s economy cannot be counted among the strongest in 
Canada, as it has only the tenth largest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita among the 
Canadian provinces and territories, as well as having a heavy public debt burden.
14
   
In terms of the differences in their ideological character, the Flemish nationalist 
movement can be placed to the right of the political spectrum in Belgium, and it has 
traditionally been closely linked to the Catholic Church; whereas the Québécois nationalist 
movement leans more to the left, and is a proponent of a secularism that developed in Québec 
during the Révolution Tranquille (Quiet Revolution) of the 1960s.
15
 Therefore, we are left 
with the question as to why the current differences between the region of Flanders in Belgium 
and the province of Québec in Canada, as well as the structural contrasts of the Flemish and 
Québécois nationalist movements, have not resulted in more of a divergence in the nationalist 
profiles of the two nationalist movements? This question is of particular interest from the 
Flemish perspective; in considering that the region of Flanders and Dutch-speak Flemings in 
general account for the demographic majority in Belgium, and that the region of Flanders has 
obtained significant political autonomy (notably over language and cultural matters), why 
have we not observed a transformation of the Flemish nationalist discourse? 
As a means of attempting to understand why the nationalist discourse concerning the 
cultural and linguistic agendas, and the political strategies and objectives of Flemish and 
Québécois nationalist movement remain so strikingly similar today, it is necessary to analyze 
                                                          
12 Paul M. Lewis, “Languages of Belgium,” Ethnologue: languages of the world (web version), 16th ed., (Dallas: SIL 
International, 2009): http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=BE. 
13 Government of Canada: Statistics Canada, “2006 Census: The Evolving Linguistic Portrait, 2006 Census: Highlights,” 
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-555/p1-eng.cfm; Government of Canada: Statistics Canada, 
“Population by knowledge of official language, by province and territory (2006 Census),” 
http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/demo15-eng.htm.  
14 Government of Canada: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, “Financial Security — Standard of Living,” 
http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/.3ndic.1t.4r@-eng.jsp?iid=26. 
15 Jan Erk, “Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du 
nationalisme québécois,” Recherches Sociographiques 43, no. 3 (2002): 513-514. 
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the paralleling genesis of both nationalist movements, and the subsequent conceptualization of 
their respective ‘nations’. More specifically, the impetus of the contemporary Flemish and 
Québécois nationalist movement was the mobilization of nationalist academics and ‘elites’ 
(political leaders, social advocates, artists, etc.) who sought to overcome the limitations on 
their socio-economic mobility, due to the presence of a cultural division of labour that was 
imposed along linguistic lines. This oppositional reaction was a catalyst for the contemporary 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements; framing their nature as expressions of an 
‘ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest’, embodying a sense of injustice, victimization, and 
struggle, which has, in turn, helped to define the characteristics of the collective conception of 
the Flemish and Québécois national identity—an ethno-linguistically defined national 
community that is territorially linked to a historic ‘national homeland’, and which is in 
perpetual opposition and struggle against the imposition and dominance of another nation. 
 According to Christophe Traisnel, a ‘nationalism of protest’ has the objective of 
imposing on a state a political and institutional recognition of a community’s national identity. 
This objective is pursued through nationalist agitation aimed at spreading awareness of a 
community’s collective national identity, which is in contradiction with the state’s own 
national identity doctrine, and then inciting a mobilization around that national character.
16
 
This type of nationalism is consistent among nationalist movements of ‘stateless’ nations. 
However, in an attempt to establish a more specific definition of a nationalism of protest in the 
context of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, we have built on Traisnel’s 
definition by isolating the importance of language to the nature of both nationalist movements, 
and to the collective identity of the Flemish and Québécois nations. Thus, we have specified 
the expression of an ‘ethno-linguistic’ nationalism of protest; identifying a linguistically based 
cultural division of labour as having been the catalyst for an oppositional reaction and 
nationalist agitation in Flanders and in Québec, which has subsequently shaped the character 
of both nationalist movements by framing the Flemish and Québécois national identities as 
being ethno-linguistic nations in a state of struggle. 
                                                          
16 Christophe  Traisnel, “Le nationalisme de contestation en Amérique du Nord,” in Le Québec à l’aube du nouveau 
millénaire: entre tradition et modernité, edited by Marie-Christine Weidmann Kopp (Québec: Press de l’Université du 
Québec, 2008), 21-22. 
 
 
5 
 
A key underlying principle of collective identity formation is opposition, and the very 
nature of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements as expressions of protest went a 
long way in shaping the character of the Flemish and Québécois national identities.
17
 Thus, 
nationalists’ conceptualization of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nations were built 
on sentiments of opposition and protest, which act as boundaries in defining both national 
identities. Nationalist leaders and the intelligentsia of both Flanders and Québec have acted as 
a causal mechanism in shaping the character of the nationalist movements, most notability by 
utilizing the shared memories and symbols of historic myths as the building blocks in 
constructing and reinforcing the collective cultural identity of an ethno-linguistic nation, 
which has been suppressed under the domination and imposition of another nation. For 
Flemish nationalists that other nation is the French-speaking Walloons in Belgium, and for 
Québécois nationalists it is the Anglophones in Canada. 
Thus, this dissertation postulates that the key explanatory variable as to why the 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have maintained similar nationalist profiles, 
despite the development of socio-demographic and structural differences, is the perpetual 
conception of the nation as defined by the principles of a Flemish and Québécois ethno-
linguistic nationalism of protest, which were initially conceived in reaction to a linguistically 
defined cultural division of labour. However, in order to analyze how the similar origins and 
conception of the national identity are the explanatory variables for the continuing paralleling 
profiles of both nationalist movements, it is necessary to focus on the important role played by 
shared memories and their symbolic representations. Shared memories and symbols have 
acted as antecedent variables in helping to shape the nature of the nationalist movements and 
the collective conception of the national identities; and subsequently, they have been 
employed as a vehicle to perpetuate the tenets and ideals of each nationalist movement and 
national identity. Nationalists can act as the causal mechanism in shaping the collective 
conscience of a group’s identity and the nature of the nationalist movement, by 
instrumentalizing the interpretation and transmission of shared memoires. History does not 
generate a collective identity by itself, but rather requires the subjective construction in the 
present; and thus, nationalists endeavour to shape the groups collective memory from that 
                                                          
17 Daniele Conversi, “Reassessing current theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as a boundary maintenance and creation,” 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1, No. 1 (1995): 79.  
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which in the past continues to have pertinence and carries influence within the present 
situation.
18
  
By employing a method of comparative analysis known as process tracing, which is a 
means of analyzing intervening variables that link putative causes to observed effects,
19
 we 
can examine how the mirroring influence of a cultural division of labour has defined the 
development of the similar tenets of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements, in terms of embodying an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, and how those 
ideals influenced the construction and perpetuation of the collective conception of the Flemish 
and Québécois nations. More specifically, we use process tracing to analyze how of key 
shared memories have been relied upon as the causal mechanism in perpetuating the tenets of 
an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and the conception of a nation ‘in peril’, which 
subsequently explains the continued presence of paralleling nationalist profiles in Flanders and 
Québec.  
However, it is important to note that a limitation of our analysis is that its focus is less 
on the explicit agency of specific Flemish and Québécois nationalist elites. Instead, the 
analysis of the instrumentalization of shared memories on the part of Flemish and Québécois 
nationalists (via secondary sources detailing the development and use of shared memories in 
Flanders and Québec) is implicitly taken from a ‘presentist’ perspective, which assumes the 
employment of the past for present purposes, and that the past is a particularly useful resource 
for expressing nationalists’ interest. The images of the past and struggles over history are used 
as vehicles for establishing a group’s power, or lack of power in the present.20 The presentist 
perspective on memory emphasizes instrumentalism or meaning dimensions of memory. The 
former views the entrepreneurship of memory as a manipulation of the past for particular 
purposes, while the latter sees selective memory as an inevitable consequence of the fact that 
humans interpret the world—including the past—on the basis of experience and within 
cultural frameworks.
21
 Therefore, the cultural division of labour and key shared memories are 
the focus of our analysis as explanatory factors for the continuation of paralleling nationalist 
                                                          
18 Allan Megill, “History, memory, identity,” History of the Human Sciences 11, No. 3 (1998): 56. 
19 Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research,” MacArthur Foundation Workshop 
on Case Study Methods (Harvard University, October 17-19, 1997). 
20 Jeffrey L. Olick and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From “Collective Memory” to the Historical Sociology of 
Mnemonic Practices,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 127-128. 
21 Ibid., 128. 
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profiles in Flanders and Québec; whereas the role of nationalists is implicitly viewed as the 
causal mechanism in establishing the nature of the nationalist movements, and in perpetuating 
the mirroring tenets of Flemish and Québécois nationalism over time. 
The theoretical framework of J.S. Mill’s method of agreement argues that cases sharing 
a common outcome will also share common hypothesized causal factors, despite varying in 
other significant ways.
22
 Therefore, a comparative analysis of the Flemish and Québécois 
nationalist movements is an ideal case study for furthering an understanding as to why 
stateless national movements very often share a commonality in terms of the discourse 
defining their nationalist profiles. Our research also highlights the importance of analysing the 
seminal historical factors, and subsequently the use of shared memories, which have acted 
both as an impetus for the development of the nationalist movements, and also as explanatory 
variables regarding the nationalist movements’ contemporary profile.     
   
This dissertation is divided into three parts, each of which comprises two chapters. 
“Part I” presents both the theoretical framework and the methodology of our historical 
comparative analysis of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. The opening 
chapter outlines the three main scholarly approaches to the study of nations and nationalism, 
as well as a presentation of Miroslav Hroch’s theory of the developmental process of national 
movements. The first chapter also provides a detailed explanation of a ‘cultural division of 
labour’ and definition of ‘shared memories’, before culminating with a presentation of the 
theoretical framework of our analysis. The second chapter then details the methodology of our 
research, explaining the structure of the historical comparative analysis, which is based on a 
method known as ‘process tracing’. 
“Part II” of the dissertation discusses the development of the Flemish and Québécois 
nationalist movements: Chapter 3 explores the paralleling development of both nationalist 
movements, providing a cross case historical comparative analysis, before ultimately 
reviewing their similar contemporary nationalist profiles. Subsequently, chapter 4 explains 
                                                          
22 Edwin Amenta, “What We Know about the Development of Social Policy: Comparative and Historical Research in 
Comparative and Historical Perspective,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by James 
Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 341.  
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that, in contrast to the strikingly similar nationalist profiles, there are clear socio-demographic 
and structural differences between the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. 
In “Part III”, the final part of this dissertation, we examine key shared memories (and 
the symbols reflecting them) that have been integral to the development and perpetuation of 
the nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec. This is achieved by analyzing how the 
nature of both nationalist movements is impacted by the evocation, interpretation, and 
transmission of key shared memories and their symbolic reflections. Chapter 5 will first 
explore the linkage between shared memories and symbols, a sense of territoriality, and 
Flemish and Québécois nationalists’ conception of the national identity. Then in Chapter 6, we 
trace the historical process accounting for the development of key shared memories within the 
historical narratives of the Flemish and Québécois national communities, and subsequently 
how these shared memories, and their symbolic reflections, were evoked and shaped by 
nationalists in Flanders and Québec as a means of obtaining their objectives. Ultimately, we 
demonstrate that due to the historic presence of a linguistic based cultural division of labour, 
nationalists in Flanders and Québec established a similar sense of ‘ethno-linguistic nationalism 
of protest’ and similar conception of their respective national identities, which was 
established, and perpetuated, by relying on key shared memories as a tool of their nationalist 
agitation.  
Finally, the dissertation concludes with an overview of our analysis on the two 
nationalist movements, underscoring the importance of analysing the historical factors that 
influence the genesis of a nationalist movement, and reiterating the role that shared memories 
and symbols can have in shaping the nature of nationalist movements today. This final chapter 
also suggests future avenues of research on nationalist movements that our model of analysis 
may be applicable to.  
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Part I – Theory and Methodology 
Chapter 1  
The Study of Nations and Nationalism 
Before embarking on an analysis of a nationalist movement, it is imperative to have a 
better understanding of nations and nationalism, and their inter-relation. Nationalism is 
inseparably linked to the perception of belonging to a nation. Essentially, a nation can be 
defined as a community, located in a historically shared territory, and having the self-
recognition of being defined by common social, economic, and legal rights and duties for all 
members.
23
 Moreover, the sentiment of ‘belonging’ to the nation, stems from a community of 
people maintaining a semblance of social solidarity and a mutual recognition of a common 
identity. This social solidarity and collective identity are based on objective criteria, namely 
ethnicity and culture, which are translated into a sense of national membership.
24
 These 
characteristics affirm the community’s national identity, while also constructing a distinction 
from ‘other’ communities. Furthermore, there is a demarcation of the ‘us’ (those belonging to 
the nation) and the ‘them’ (the outsiders, or foreigners), which is the essence of nationalist 
discourse; and in turn, this nationalist discourse constantly shapes individuals’ consciousness 
and meaning of the world within the context of their nation, as well as producing and 
reproducing people as ‘nationals’.25  
These ideals of belonging, distinctiveness, and membership are indirectly linked to the 
perceived origins of the nation. However, the inquiry into nationalism before the 1980s took 
the origin of the nation for granted, ignoring the importance of the present day production and 
reproduction of the idea of ‘nationhood’.26 Recent scholarship on nationalism has brought into 
focus an emphasis on explaining how the nation, or the modern conception of nationhood, 
came about, and subsequently how it translates into manifestations of nationalism. In fact, the 
study of nationalism today is centralized on one basic dilemma: to what extent are nations and 
nationalisms a modern phenomenon?
27
 In other words, to what extent are nations and 
nationalism the products of modern conditions, such as capitalism, industrialization, 
                                                          
23 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), 14. 
24 Craig Calhoun, Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 34-35. 
25 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995), 78-79. 
26 Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 56. 
27 Ibid., 60.  
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urbanization, and secularism? And, how do modern nations relate to pre-modern ethnic 
communities? 
 This principal dilemma of contemporary studies on nations and nationalism has 
resulted in what is arguably the most fundamental cleavage in the theoretical debate on 
nationalism; a debate that is between ‘primordialist’ scholars, who subscribe to the idea that 
nations are incessant entities, and ‘modernists’, who believe that the conception of the nation 
is strictly a modern phenomenon.
28
 Our analysis of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements is in-line with this contemporary trend of attempting to establish linkages between 
an understanding of the origins of the nation and the expressions of nationalism.   
In addition, the theoretical framework for our endeavour borrows from the emerging 
middle ground of the traditional divide between ‘primordialists’ and ‘modernists’, in the form 
of an approach referred to as ‘ethno-symbolism’. The ethno-symbolist approach stresses the 
symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities for today’s nations, and it seeks to shows how 
ethnic cultures define the parameters in which ‘elites’ can attempt to forge the nation.29 The 
principles of ethno-symbolism help to explain how nationalists in Flanders and Québec helped 
establish a collective historical memory and symbolic legacy of specific events in the 
historical narratives of their respective communities, as a means of constructing a similar 
conception of the nation, and a mirroring type of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest. 
Ultimately, it is this paralleling conceptualization of nationhood and the perpetuation of a 
sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest that accounts for the similar nationalist profiles 
of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements.  
In the following sections we present the three main approaches to the study of nations 
and nationalism, as well as Miroslav Hroch’s theory of the developmental process of national 
movements, and provide a definition of shared memories and a cultural division of labour; all 
of which are used to establish the theoretical framework for our analysis.  
       
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Ibid.  
29 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (New York: Routledge, 1998), 224. 
 
 
11 
 
1.1 Approaches to the Study of Nations and Nationalism  
 Although no other socio-political phenomenon has been as prominent in shaping the 
face of the modern world as nationalism, it was not held in high regard by social scientists 
until relatively recently. Formerly, nationalism was seen by liberal and Marxist thinkers as a 
‘passing phase’, and it only became the subject of substantial and sustained academic inquiry 
starting in the 1920s and 1930s.
30
  However, it was not until the 1960s that nationalism had a 
major breakthrough as a subject of academic investigation, with the important works put forth 
by scholars such as Elie Kedourie and Ernest Gellner, two academics that laid the foundation 
for the modernist school of thought on nationalism.
31
 Then, in the 1980s, the study of 
nationalism would witness a renaissance of sorts, with theories and approaches becoming 
more sophisticated and rich, and a clearer division between the schools of thought on the 
subject beginning to take shape.
32
 
 Essentially, three main approaches to the study of nationalism have developed: 
primordialism/perennialism, modernism, and ethno-symbolism.
33
 Although the study of 
nationalism is not strictly limited to these three categories, they are undoubtedly the focus of, 
and basis for, the bulk of the studies on nations, nationalism, and national movements. The 
following sections will briefly outline key elements of these three main approaches as they 
relate to our body of research, and with an emphasis being given to key principles of 
modernism and ethno-symbolism as the theoretical basis for our research model.   
 
1.2 Primordialism and Perennialism 
 Primordialism is the oldest paradigm in the study of nations and nationalism. It is 
essentially the idea that being a member of a nation is a ‘natural’ part of human beings, and 
that nations have basically always existed. Primordialist explanations of nations and 
nationalism are based on the principles of the origins and strength of ethnic identities.
34
 
Starting from the time of the ‘German Romantics’ in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, primordialists have believed that the world consists of natural nations, or ‘organic 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 1.  
31 See: Elie Kedourie, Nationalism 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, [1960] 1994), and Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).  
32 Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 2.  
33 Ibid., 213.  
34 Ibid., 64. 
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nationalism’, and that nations are the bedrock of history and the principal actors in the world’s 
historical narrative. In other words, nations and their characters are organisms that can be 
easily ascertained by their cultural differences; and oftentimes, nationalists seek to restore lost 
national self-consciousness among the members of nations—a ‘reawakening’ of the organic 
nation.
35
  
 Umut Özkirimli explains that there are three categories of primordialism: the 
sociobiological approach, the cultural primordialist approach, and the naturalist approach.
36
 
The sociobiological approach applies findings in the field of socio-biology to the study of 
ethnic ties. It seeks the origins of ethnic and national ties in genetic mechanisms and instincts, 
treating the nation as an extension of kin selection (or mating with ethnic ‘relatives’) based on 
cultural criteria.
37
 The cultural primordialist approach focuses on the perception and beliefs of 
the individuals; it is based on the idea that what generates the strong attachments people feel 
for ‘given’ sentiments of social existence and identity is the very belief in their ‘sacredness’.38 
Finally, the naturalist approach is based on the idea that national identities are a ‘natural’ part 
of all human beings, just like speech or sight. In other words, a person has a nationality in the 
same way they have eyes and ears.
39
  
 There is also a contemporary incarnation of primordialism, known as perennialism, 
which was established by scholars also suggesting that nations have existed as historic entities 
and have developed over the centuries with their intrinsic character largely unchanged. The 
difference separating perennialists from primordialists is that the former concedes the 
antiquity of ethnic and national ties without insisting that they are ‘natural’.40 Another key 
characteristic of perennialists is the readily accepted modernity of nationalism as a political 
movement and ideology; however, perennialist scholars regard nations as either updated 
versions of immemorial ethnic communities, or as collective cultural identities that have 
existed in all epochs of human history.
41
 Therefore, perennialism has closed the gap between 
                                                          
35 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (New York: Routledge, 1998), 146. 
36 Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 70-71. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 72. 
39 Ibid., 66. 
40 Ibid., 68; Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 53. 
41 Ibid., 159. 
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primordialism and modernism, and opened the door for the development of ‘ethno-
symbolism’, which will be explained further along.     
 
1.3 Modernism 
 In the 1960s, modernism, which was influenced by the decolonization occurring at the 
time in Asia and Africa, developed in reaction to primordialism’s seemingly outdated axiom 
of an inherent nature of nations. Instead, modernists began to regard nations and nationalism 
as historically formed modern constructs.
42
 Modernists (sometimes referred to as 
instrumentalists) criticize primordialists’ cultural attachments to the nation, such as language, 
religion, and kinship, as being alterable elements.  
 For example, critical of the importance primordialists place on the relationship between 
language and an individual’s bond to the nation, Paul Brass points out that many people in the 
world do not think about their language or attach any emotional significance to it. Brass 
explains that many people speak more than one language or dialect in multilingual developing 
societies, and many illiterate people in these countries have little or no attachment to their 
‘mother tongue’. 43  Furthermore, Brass also questions the cultural attachments between 
religions and nations, stating that religions have been subject to immense changes over the 
centuries; and Brass explains that even place of birth and kinship can lose their emotional 
significance for many people. Basically, for modernists like Paul Brass, the ethnic cultural 
foundation of nations is created by ‘elites’ as a means of uniting communities and mobilizing 
them for social and political advantage.
44
 
 According to the modernist approach, the modernity that gave life to the concepts of 
nations and nationalism was the rapid socio-economic changes that began in the late 
eighteenth century, which came about after the debut of industrial revolution in England, and 
the ‘Age of Enlightenment’ that was ushered in by the American and French Revolutions. The 
result of this phenomenon of modernity was modern processes such as capitalism, 
industrialism, the emergence of the bureaucratic state, urbanization, and secularism; all of 
                                                          
42 Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 85. 
43 Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism (Newbury Park: Sage, 1991), 70-72.  
44 Ibid.  
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which, modernists contend, created the sociological necessity of nationalism, from which the 
nation was born.
45
  
Among modernist scholars, the work of Ernest Gellner can be said to have an almost 
emblematic status. The modern study of nationalism arguably began with Gellner’s 
contribution in attempting to analyze nationalism as primarily a political principle, which 
holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.
46
 Gellner explains the 
modernist perception of nationalism as a sociological necessity of the modern world, by 
highlighting the absence of nations and nationalism in the ‘pre-modern’ ages, and noting that 
the nationality of the ruler during these periods was not important to the ruled.
47
 According to 
Gellner, nationalism could not operate in pre-modern ‘agrarian societies’ because the role of 
culture was to reinforce, underwrite, and render visible and authoritative the hierarchical status 
system of the social order of the time.
48
  
For Gellner, nationalism arises from the relationship between power and culture that 
occurs within industrialized societies, in which nationalism becomes a product of 
industrialized social organization. Consequently, nations can be defined in terms of the 
coming of the ‘age of nationalism’. Gellner states that nations have emerged “when general 
social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, 
pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities.”49 This idea of ‘high culture’ refers 
to a specially cultivated, standardized, and education based literate culture, which establishes a 
system of norms and communications. The exigencies of social organization that stem from 
industrialization call for a standardization of communication (a common language), as well as 
an educated and culturally homogenous society, in order to facilitate the convergence towards 
essential technical and occupational norms of industrialized jobs.
50
  
Therefore, nationalism becomes the instrument of the society’s social elites and 
intelligentsia, in terms of establishing the state structure and bureaucracy needed to develop 
the body of complex, formalized, mass participation in educational processes, which bring all 
                                                          
45 Ibid; Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 29; E. J. Hobsbawm, 
Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 10.  
46 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 1.  
47 Ibid.,  6; Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), 153.  
48 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York University  Press, 1997), 20-21.  
49 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 132. 
50 Ibid., 47. 
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of a society’s members into contact with ‘high culture’. Subsequently, according to Gellner, 
people come to ‘love’ their culture, seeing it as an essential condition of their wellbeing and 
functioning, because it underpins and makes possible their economic existence.
51
 Furthermore, 
successful participation in ‘high culture’ means successful involvement in contractual 
relationships among individuals who understand ‘things’ in the same way, and sharing a 
common conceptual currency. Gellner believes that this makes people aware of their 
nationality and acutely conscious of their differences from others, with whom they cannot 
communicate as readily. Thus, the limits of the nation are found where the break-lines occur 
between cultures; while at the same time, mobility weakens the differentiation between social 
layers typical of pre-modern societies, resulting in the modern society taking on the shape of 
being an “internally fluid, culturally continuous community,” which is referred to as the 
nation.
52
 Ultimately, Gellner’s link between the nation-state and nationalism is centred on the 
functional relationship between the needs of a modern economy, with its interchangeable 
unites of labour, and the formation of a uniform culture. As a result, people are made aware of 
a common situation and identity, thus stimulating sentiments of loyalty and ‘love’ for their 
nation.  
 Ernst Gellner’s modernist theory of nations and nationalism, although said to contain 
traces of historical materialism, is essentially based on a liberal view of society.
53
 Tom Nairn, 
another influential modernist thinker, developed a materialist approach to explaining 
nationalism, stating that the basis for nationalism should be sought in the general process of 
historical development since the end of the eighteenth century. In other words, nationalism is 
“determined by certain features of the world political economy, in the era between the French 
and Industrial Revolutions and the present day.”54 For Nairn, the spread of nationalism is not 
simply a product of industrialization and the Age of Enlightenment, but rather the result of an 
‘uneven development’ of societies since the dawn of modernization during the eighteenth 
century. As a result of this ‘uneven development’ and spread of modernization and capitalism, 
those regions and countries able to lead in modernization acted as the metropolis, dominating 
those regions and countries of the periphery, which, in turn, were compelled to find their own 
                                                          
51 Graham Day and Andrew Thompson, Theorizing Nationalism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 47. 
52 Ibid., 48.  
53 Ibid., 47. 
54 Tom Nairn, The Break-Up Of Britain, 3rd ed., (Altona, Australia: Common Ground Publishing, 2003), 320. 
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means of advancement.
55
 The elites of the regions and countries on the developmental 
periphery wanted the advantages of modernization, but they had to mobilize their societies in 
such a way as to reject direct intervention from the metropolis. Therefore, a ‘historical short-
cut’ to modernization was required, or in other words, the “conscious formation of a militant 
inter-class community rendered strongly (if not mythically) aware of its own separate identity 
vis-à-vis the outside forces of domination.”56 This is the foundation of nationalism, according 
to Nairn, as the periphery had to mobilize utilizing its best resource—the people and 
peculiarities of the region (language, folklore, custom, etc.); and thus, nationalism relies on the 
differentiae of a society because it must, in that it is invariably ‘populist’.57  
 Nairn’s approach has been criticized as being only applicable in situations where 
regional economic disparities were conjoined and coterminous with a particular ethnic 
community.
58
 The economic disparities and social deprivation resulting from ‘uneven 
development’ only becomes a vehicle of a nationalist political purpose if an ethnic 
community, or their elites, have been suppressed or marginalized.
59
 Nevertheless, Nairn’s 
approach can be useful in providing a basis in explaining the development of the nationalist 
movements in Flanders and Québec, which can be viewed as two sub-national entities that 
have historically been peripheral regions within states controlled by a metropolis. This is to 
say that modernization was unevenly developed in Belgium and in Canada, and as a result the 
Dutch-speakers in Flanders and French-speakers in Québec were socio-economically 
dominated and marginalized by the French-speaking Walloons and English-speaking 
Canadians respectively. 
 It can be said that the uneven socio-economic development of the Dutch-speaking 
community in Flanders and of the French-speaking community in Québec pushed Flemish and 
Québécois elites to forge a nationalist movement aimed at mobilizing the Flemish and 
Québécois society towards closing the developmental divide. As Nairn explains, “The new 
middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the 
                                                          
55 Ibid., 326. 
56 Ibid., 327. 
57 Ibid., 328. 
58 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (New York: Routledge, 1998), 54. 
59 Ibid. 
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invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood.”60 Therefore, the nationalist 
mobilization in Flanders and in Québec was based on an ethno-linguistic nationalism of 
protest, stimulated by the evocation of an ethno-linguistic sense of national identity and 
awareness of the historical injustices and indignity imposed by the ‘other’ national community 
from the metropolis.  
       
1.4 Ethno-Symbolism  
Ethno-symbolism emerged as a theoretical critique of modernism closely linked to 
perennialism, with the key difference being that the analysis of ethnicity is seen as the 
precursor to the study of nations and nationalism. For perennialists, the nation is a recurrent 
form of social organization, and nationalism is a perennial mode of cultural belonging; 
whereas ethno-symbolism is based on the notion of reaching back into the past and moving 
forward towards the present, while stressing the ‘ethno-symbolic’ nature of nations and 
nationalism.
61
  
That being said, there is also a commonality between ethno-symbolism and modernism. 
For example, there is relative agreement among ethno-symbolists and modernists that 
nationalism, as an ideology and social movement in general, is a modern phenomenon.
62
 
Nevertheless, ethno-symbolists are critical of modernist’s social constructionism and 
instrumentalism, which underpins the modernist theory of nations and nationalism.
63
 
Moreover, ethno-symbolism differentiates itself from modernism by not tying the formation 
and existence of the nation to a particular period of history, or to the process of modernization.  
The ethno-symbolist approach to the study of nations and nationalism seeks to uncover 
the symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities for nations today. The means of achieving 
this objective is by clarifying the concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’, and by recognizing the 
importance of a long history of ethnicity for the formation of nations, in an effort to 
understand the relationship between politics, ethnicity, and nationalism.
64
 Ethno-symbolism 
rejects the axiom that nations may be ipso facto invented, subscribing instead to the belief that 
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63 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9. 
64 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (New York: Routledge, 1998), 98. 
 
 
18 
 
nations rely on pre-existing texture of ethnic myths, memories, symbols, and traditions.
65
 For 
ethno-symbolists, the emergence of today’s nations cannot be understood properly without 
taking their ethnic forebears into account. As John Hutchinson explains, ethno-symbolists 
believe that the rise of nations needs to be contextualized within the larger phenomenon of the 
ethnicity which shaped them.
66
 
 Anthony D. Smith, arguably the most influential ethno-symbolist scholar, states that 
ethno-symbolism places great importance on tracing the origins and formation of nations, as 
well as their possible future course, over long periods of time, or what Smith describes as the 
study of modern nations over the “longue durée” (long duration). 67 This long-term analysis 
focuses on understanding the role that pre-existing cultures and ethnicity have in the 
emergence of the modern conception of the nation, as well as the popular and widespread 
appeal of nationalism.
 
 
 Nationalism is viewed by ethno-symbolists as an expression of aspirations by various 
social groups to create, defend, or maintain nations—their autonomy, unity, and identity—by 
drawing on the cultural resources of pre-existing ethnic communities (or ethnies, to use 
Smith’s terminology) and categories.68 For ethno-symbolists, what gives nationalism its power 
is the ethnic heritage of nations (shared memories, myths, traditions, and symbols). It is this 
popular ‘living past’ that has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by 
contemporary nationalist academics and elites.
69
 Central to the ethno-symbolist study of 
nations and nationalism is the theory that ‘shared memories’ of a collective cultural identity 
define the make-up of the nation. Smith explains that,  
“Collective cultural identities are based on the shared memories of experiences and activities of 
successive generations of a group distinguished by one or more shared cultural elements. Ethnic 
identity, in turn, may be seen as the product of shared memories of collective experiences and 
activities of successive generations of a group claiming a common origin and ancestry. Therefore, 
ethnicity may be defined as the sense of collective belonging to a named community of common 
myths of origin and shared memories, associated with an historic homeland.”70 
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 The theoretical framework of our analysis subscribes to this notion that the ‘living past’ 
of the nation can be shaped by nationalist academics and elites. In Flanders and Québec, 
nationalists academics and elites have relied on key shared memories and symbols (many 
evoking a pre-modern sense of ethno-cultural identity) as a means of constructing and 
perpetuating the modern conception of the nation, and oftentimes to contextualize the 
contemporary nationalist movement as an extension of the historical struggle against the 
imposition and indignity inflicted on the national community.       
   
1.5 Shared Memories and Symbols  
 In constructing the identity of a nation, primordialists, perennialists, and modernists are 
in agreement with ethno-symbolists regarding the need for nationalists to be able to convey a 
particular type of story about the nation and its importance; an easily transmitted story that can 
resonate emotively with the people.
71
 As Maurice Halbwachs explained, collective memory is 
not a given, but rather a socially constructed notion;
72
 and thus, nationalist academics and 
elites rely on shared memories as the vehicle of transmission for the ‘national story’, while 
transmigrating across multiple historical contexts from generation to generation. 
 However, it is important to make the clarification that by ‘shared memories’ we are not 
simply referring to a mnemonic process in which individuals exchange a recollection of 
personally lived experiences and events (although this is a factor in creating shared memories). 
Instead, we can broadly define shared memories as being specific historic events and epochs 
that are evoked, interpreted, and then transmitted through social agency—namely on the part 
of nationalist academics and elites—for the use as a resource of expressing interests; for 
example, as a differentiator and reminder of the unique culture and fate of an ethnic 
community.
73
  
 Furthermore, shared memories can be attributed with having the following 
characteristics: they are usually of a historic event that goes beyond the experience of those 
who lived it; they have an association with a tradition (cultural, political, or religious), which 
is a unique version of the past that has been collectively canonized; when the event reaches far 
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back in time, the shared memory of the event is not generally a direct historic account, but 
rather a ‘tale’ of the past; and thus, a shared memory is closer to being a ‘belief’ than historical 
knowledge; shared memories can be thought of as ‘living myths’, in which the community is 
able to ‘relive’ the essence of the event in question by channelling it to the present. 74 
Moreover, the ‘reliving’ and commemoration of shared memories are not only an act of 
identification for a community, they are also acts of real identity.
75
 Finally, shared memories 
are usually attached to specific places and defined territories, and this ‘territorialization of 
memory’ is an indispensable part of the shared memories and mythology of the community.76 
For an ethnic community, a particular geographical area becomes associated with the 
traditional place of origin, liberation, settlement, or the location of the community’s ‘golden 
ages’; and this relationship between people and land is the product over the longue durée of 
continual ‘myth-making’ and the recitation of shared memories.77  
 Along with shared memories, symbols (such as emblems, hymns, festivals, customs, 
linguistic codes, etc.) play an important role in defining a community’s history and identity, 
and in securing the attachment of many people to a particular nation.
78
 Symbols act as ‘border 
guards’ by distinguishing an ethnic community from others, with symbolic interaction acting 
as a means of communication by sending signals of identification to both members of a group, 
and to outsiders; and thus, symbols are crucial to the survival of ethnic identification.
79
 The 
content of symbols is often established generations before they can act as cues to group 
members. As John Armstrong observes, “ethnic symbolic communication is communication 
over the longue durée, between the dead and the living.”80 Therefore, the meaning behind 
what symbols represent to an ethnic community is essentially the expression of shared 
memoires.  
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Ethno-symbolists, such as Anthony D. Smith, often focus primarily on shared 
memories that evoke a community’s idealized ‘golden age’ (or ages) of virtue, heroism, 
beauty, learning, holiness, power and wealth; an era distinguished as a time of collective 
dignity and external prestige of the nation.
81
 However, for the purposes of this study we have 
classified shared memories into two categories: the first of which is shared memories of 
‘national glory’—liberation, the golden age (or ages), victories, heroes, saints and sages; and 
the second category of shared memories is those of ‘national injury’—defeats, forced 
migration, injustices and oppression.
82
 These shared memories of a community’s national 
glory and/or injury are carried forward over time, and they can be thought of as markers of the 
positive or negative events in the historical narrative of a community, and which have the 
capacity to resonate and remain within the conscious of a large number of members of the 
community. The shared memories are kept alive and transmitted over the longue durée 
through symbols, and by the teaching of the community’s history via the community’s cultural 
characteristics, such as language, myths, folktales, literature, song, etc. These collective 
memories of events exemplifying national glory and injury to national dignity are elements 
that re-enforce a sense of ethnie, while also distinguishing the national identity from that of 
‘others’.   
In the case of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, shared memories of 
national injury have been utilized as a resource in perpetuating a sense of ethno-linguistic 
nationalism of protest, and the notion of both respective nations being in a continuing state of 
struggle. As is often the case, Flemish and Québécois nationalist academics and elites have 
used shared memories of contestation and struggles over history as a vehicle for establishing 
their power, or conversely their lack of power.
83
 Many of these shared memories are 
contextualized in an epoch where an imposed cultural division of labour existed in Flanders 
and in Québec. Therefore, it is important to have an understanding of what a cultural division 
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of labour is, and how it has deeply impacted the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements.  
 
1.6 Cultural Division of Labour   
 At their foundation, the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements 
are manifestations of an ‘ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest’. This protestation at the heart 
of the development of both national movements originated as a reaction to the inequalities and 
limits on upward social mobility imposed upon Dutch-speakers in Belgium and French-
speakers in Canada. This limitation on social mobility was the result of an uneven 
development of modernization (the transformation from a traditional rural and agrarian 
society, to a secular, urban and industrial society). This is to say that, in general terms, 
Francophone Belgians and English-Canadians adapted to modernization before Dutch-
speaking Belgians and French-speaking Canadians, which in turn resulted in a discrepancy of 
economic development, largely due to linguistic inequality and discrimination imposed upon 
Dutch-speakers in Flanders and Francophones in Québec. 
 This socio-economic inequality and discrimination established along linguistic lines 
can be identified as a ‘cultural division of labour’, which occurs when individuals are assigned 
to specific types of occupations, and other social roles, on the basis of observable cultural 
traits or markers. Michael Hechter explains that the cultural division of labour is a “system of 
stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines.”84 As a 
result of this phenomenon, ethnic boundaries coincide with lines of structural differentiation, 
and collective action based on ethnic boundaries ensues; or in other words, the ethnic 
solidarity that results from a cultural division of labour often leads to a nationalist movement. 
Furthermore, this structural discrimination can exist regardless of the level of structural 
differentiation in the society as a whole.
85
  
 The cultural division of labour in Belgium and Canada resulted in the Dutch-speaking 
Flemish community and the French-speaking Québécois community being over-represented in 
the working class and under-represented in the middle and upper classes, as well as having an 
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under-representation in positions of economic importance and political decision making.
86
 
From the origin of the Belgian state in 1830, until the middle of the twentieth century, the 
language of administration, commerce, and higher education in Flanders was in French, and 
Belgium’s Francophone bourgeoisies controlled the stores, clubs, and theatres in Flemish 
cities. Therefore, up until the ‘Flemish Movement’ gained the political recourse to address the 
socio-economic situation of Flemings, the Dutch-speaking people of Belgium were resigned to 
being culturally underdeveloped and economically poor, with the social mobility of Flemings 
limited to agricultural and industrial labour.
87
   
  In Québec, the origins of a cultural division of labour can be traced back to the 
decades following the British conquest of North America in 1760, when English-speakers held 
the key colonial economic positions in what was at the time Lower Canada. This Anglophone 
dominance of economic functions in Québec would continue after Canada’s Confederation in 
1867. The industrialization of Québec in the twentieth century only served to exacerbate the 
hierarchy of the cultural division of labour, as managerial positions in Québec’s large 
Anglophone owned enterprises were reserved almost exclusively for other Anglophones. 
Consequently, French-Canadians were resigned to blue-collar positions within the English-
Canadian managed industrial enterprises.
88
   
 According to John Armstrong, the point of departure for the genesis of a nation can be 
ethnic exclusion.
89
 Essentially, this is what occurred in Flanders and in Québec, where 
nationalists viewed the linguistic inequalities and cultural division of labour as the principal 
demarcation between their disadvantaged nation (the Flemish and the Québécois), and the 
dominant nation (the Francophones of Belgium and the Anglophones of Canada). The more 
there is a presence of a conflict or contradiction between two opposing groups of elites—
national elites in opposition to the ‘alien’ elites of the discriminatory community—the greater 
the national elites’ efforts in mobilizing the masses around a national consciousness.90 Thus, 
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the socio-economic inequality caused by the imposition of a linguistically based cultural 
division of labour acted as the catalyst for Flemish and Québécois nationalist academics and 
elites to identify their linguistic communities as forming a territorially defined nation. These 
nationalists then mobilized their respective communities within a nationalist movement, in an 
effort to reverse the socio-economic inequalities and lift the limitations on their social mobility 
by creating their proper nation-state structure within Flanders and Québec, which in both 
instances was founded on the principles of their respective ethno-linguistic national 
identities.
91
      
 However, before the development of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements can be adequately reviewed, it is necessary to define a framework for the analysis 
of the developmental process of a national movement. Fortunately, Miroslav Hroch can be 
credited with creating an approach that specifically targets the study of a national movement’s 
development. 
 
1.7 Developmental Process of National Movements 
 Miroslav Hroch’s theory of the developmental process of a national movement is based 
on the analysis of ‘non-dominant’ ethnic groups, usually occupying a compact territory, which 
are dominated by an ‘exogenous’ ruling class. These non-dominant ethnic groups, which lack 
their own states, an indigenous ruling elite, and often a continuous cultural tradition in their 
own literary language, eventually go through an identity awakening, during which time group 
members become aware of their own ‘ethnicity’ and start to conceive of themselves as a 
potential nation.
92
 As certain members of the group compare their situation to that of the 
established nations, there is the sentiment of certain deficits. These future nationalists begin 
efforts to overcome those deficits, seeking to obtain support of their compatriots. Hroch 
defines these organized endeavours aimed at achieving all the attributes of a full-fledged 
nation as being a ‘national movement’.93  
                                                          
91 Jan Erk, “Le Québec entre la Flandre et la Wallonie : Une comparaison des nationalismes sous-étatiques belges et du 
nationalisme québécois,” Recherches Sociographiques 43, no. 3 (2002): 504. 
92 Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), 114-115. 
93 Ibid., 115; Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation Building Process in 
Europe,” New Left Review 198 (1993): 6. 
 
 
25 
 
 According to Hroch, a national movement’s evolution occurs along three phases. In the 
beginning phase, or ‘Phase A’, the bulk of the nationalist activity is devoted to the scholarly 
inquiry into, and the propagation of, an awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social, economic 
and historical attributes of the non-dominant ethnic group.
94
 This initial stage of the nationalist 
movement is followed by ‘Phase B’, during which a new range of nationalist activists emerge 
seeking to win over as many members of their ethnic community as possible to the project of 
creating a modern nation. In this secondary phase, nationalists set out to achieve their goals by 
way of patriotic or nationalist agitation, which is essentially an effort to spread the idea of the 
national identity.
95
 Finally, ‘Phase C’ occurs once a large majority of the members of the non-
dominant ethnic group link their social and political well-being to a ‘national identity’ of the 
ethnic group, with the ‘national consciousness’ then becoming the concern of the majority of 
the population; and thus, a mass movement emerges.
96
  
 Hroch underlines that one of the most important criteria for any typology of national 
movements is the relationship between the transitions to Phase B, and then to Phase C, and 
that the ‘periodization’ between phases allows for meaningful comparisons between national 
movements.
97
 We argue that the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements transitioned 
from ‘Phase A’ of their development—the scholarly inquiry and propagation of an awareness 
of their respective linguistic, cultural, social, economic, and historical attributes—to ‘Phase 
B’—a period of nationalist agitation aimed at spreading the idea of the national identity—at 
very different times. However, the development of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements into socio-political mass movements, rooted in a widely held ethno-linguistic 
sense of the nation, would occur around relatively the same time, during the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Thus, Hroch’s theoretical model proves a useful tool in outlining the 
developmental phases of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. 
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1.8 Theoretical Framework 
Our analysis focuses on the development of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements, and the role that shared memories and their symbolic representations have played 
in establishing and perpetuating a similar ethno-lingustic and territorially linked conception of 
national identity. This idea of the national identity is characterized by a sense of opposition 
and struggle as defined by the principles of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which 
originated as a reaction to the linguistically defined cultural division of labour that was present 
in Flanders and Québec. The continuation of this ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest in 
Flanders and Québec, and subsequently the conception of the Flemish and Québécois nations, 
are central to the vitality of both nationalist movements.  
Essentially, the theoretical framework of our research is based on three key principles 
regarding a nationalist movement’s development: the theory of an uneven development and 
the effects of a subsequent ‘cultural division of labour’; the tenets of ‘reactive ethnicity 
perspective’, in terms of explaining the establishment of group solidarity and a sense of 
nation; and the role of shared memories and symbols in establishing and sustaining the nature 
of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. 
 As previously mentioned, we postulate that the genesis of both the contemporary 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements can be explained by the development of an 
ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which was essentially established in reaction to a 
cultural division of labour defined along linguistic lines that had been historically present in 
Flanders and in Québec. As a means of overcoming the limitations on their social mobility, 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist academics and ‘elites’ relied on a nationalist agitation 
based on a discourse of a national identity that was contextualized by the struggle, oppression, 
and victimization of the nation. Moreover, this conception of the nation has been largely 
shaped by the evocation of shared memories of a national struggle to overcome the injustices 
inflicted on the Flemish and Québécois peoples.   
 The frontiers that developed in the eyes of the nationalists in Flanders (between the 
Flemish and Walloons) and in Québec (between the Québécois and English Canada) was 
based along ethno-linguistic lines, which we explain as being exacerbated, in both instances, 
by the effects of an uneven socio-economic development that came in the wake of modernity. 
Within Belgium and Canada, the effects of this ‘uneven development’ began in the mid-
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nineteenth century and lasted until the mid-twentieth century, leaving the Dutch-speaking 
Flemish community and the French-Canadian community as the socio-economic ‘periphery’ 
in relation to the dominant ‘metropolis’ (English-speaking Canada and French-speaking 
Wallonia respectively).  
 Stemming from this uneven development, a ‘cultural division of labour’ was 
established, with the Dutch-speaking people of Belgium and the Francophones of Canada 
having their social mobility limited, as well as being over-represented in the working and 
agricultural classes, and under-represented politically and within the upper social classes.
98
 In 
reaction to the cultural division of labour, Flemish and Québécois nationalist academics and 
elites promoted the development of a nationalist movement as a means of overcoming the 
imposed limitations on their socio-economic mobility. Both of these nationalist movements 
have been equally fixated on the injustices and indignity suffered by their nations at the hands 
of the dominant Anglophone Canadians and Francophone Walloons respectively; and thus, the 
discourse employed by both nationalist movements has embodied the principles of 
‘contentious politics’. As Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow explain, contentious politics are 
interactions between actors that are centred on matters of mutual claims of interests.
99
 This has 
been the case in Flanders and in Québec, where both nationalist movements have sought to 
wrestle political power from the federal government of the Belgian and Canadian state 
respectively, which has historically been intent on keeping it.  
 This engagement in contentious politics, which is often the case for ‘stateless’ 
nationalist movements, is a driving force behind the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements’ expression of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest; with political identities 
being based on the notion of a frontier separating the nation from the others, and with the 
contemporary conception of the nation being defined and perpetuated by key shared memories 
of the injustices inflicted upon the nation by the others. This phenomenon is in-line with the 
‘reactive ethnicity perspective’, which theorizes that when there is the presence of a ‘cultural 
division of labour’, the solidarity of ethnic identities is often perceived in the context of a 
collective oppression. Moreover, the ethnic ties among economically disadvantaged 
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individuals—specifically that of language in the case of the Flemish and Québécois—plays an 
important role in facilitating conditions for the group formation essential to political 
mobilization.
100
 
 In our effort to understand why the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements share a similar nationalist profile, despite having socio-demographic and structural 
differences, we carry this theoretical framework one step further in explaining that even after 
the obstacles to social mobility for Dutch-speaking Flemish and French-speaking Québécois 
had been significantly overcome, thereby arguably eliminating the need to reinforce group 
solidarity along ethnic and occupational lines (which had previously been the case with the 
presents of a cultural division of labour), the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements have continued to rely on an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest as a 
gallivanting force in shaping the conception of their national identities. Furthermore, both 
nationalist movements have relied upon the evocation of shared memories as a means of 
perpetuating a sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, and subsequent conception of 
the nation; and it is this phenomenon that accounts for the continuation of similar nationalist 
profiles in Flanders and Québec, despite diverging structural and socio-demographic 
influences.  
 Our research focuses on the developmental process of the Flemish and Québécois 
nationalist movement, which reveals paralleling factors of origin while having clear 
differences in structural evolution. We also focus on the influence of key shared memories and 
symbols in perpetuating a similar sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and 
conception of the nation. To achieve this objective we utilize a method of historical 
comparative analysis referred to as ‘process tracing’. The following chapter outlines the 
methodological approach of our analysis.  
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Chapter 2  
Methodology 
Essentially, the objective of this dissertation is the isolation of independent variables 
that have a direct causal effect on the dependent variable. As previously mentioned, the 
dependent variable in question is the nationalist profiles of the contemporary Flemish and 
Québécois nationalist movements, which are strikingly similar despite the presence of 
structural and socio-demographic differences. As a means of explaining this phenomenon, we 
have identified two related independent variables: the first being the perpetuated principles of 
an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which originate from a mobilization against a 
linguistically defined cultural division of labour in Flanders and Québec; and secondly, the 
continued conceptualization of the Flemish and Québécois national identity as an ethno-
linguistic ethnie, embodying a sense of survival in the face of historical injustices and 
upholding the ideal of a constant struggle against the enduring threat of renewed imposition 
and oppression at the hands of ‘others’. This conception of the national identity has been 
framed by the tenets of the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest established by Flemish and 
Québécois nationalists; and because these two independent variables are interdependent, our 
research views them together as accounting for the key causal variable as to why both 
nationalist movements continue to share a similar nationalist profile. Furthermore, we examine 
the instrumentalization and employment of key shared memories and symbolic linkages to the 
past on the part of nationalists, which can be defined as the causal mechanism for the 
perpetuation of the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and the conception of the nation 
within the nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec.   
A summary of our hypothesis is that the causal variable as to why the Flemish and 
Québécois nationalist movements have maintained similar nationalist profiles, despite 
contrasting socio-demographic realities and structural differences, is the perpetual conception 
of the nation as defined by the principles of the Flemish and Québécois ethno-linguistic 
nationalism of protest—the origin of which stems from a reaction to a linguistically defined 
cultural division of labour. Thus, as a means of testing our hypothesis, we use a multi-leveled 
historical comparative analysis approach, which relies on a method of process tracing to chart 
the causal chain from the genesis of the nationalist movements and national identities, to their 
perpetuation through the use of key shared memories.  
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2.1 Historical Comparative Analysis 
 The historical comparative analysis approach has been a fixture in the social sciences 
for a long time, going as far back as the works of Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, and 
Karl Marx. In fact, there has been a dramatic re-emergence of the comparative historical 
approach in recent decades.
101
 As James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer explain, the 
historical comparative analysis approach is geared towards the explicit analysis of historical 
sequences and it takes seriously the unfolding of processes over time.
102
 It is a model of 
analysis that aims to produce an explanation of important outcomes within delimited historical 
contexts, usually focusing on a small number of cases. Furthermore, this type of approach is 
concerned with causal analysis, the exploration of temporal processes, and uses systematic and 
contextualized comparisons.
103
 Therefore, because we are concerned with an analysis of two 
nationalist movements within the context of their respective temporal development, a 
historical comparative analysis approach is ideal for our endeavour.  
 As our analysis is essentially the explanation of an outcome (or dependent variable) by 
using related causal independent variables, our approach can be said to be deterministic in 
nature. In following James Mahoney’s definition of determinism, our approach assumes the 
existence of independent variables that exhibit a causal relationship with the outcome of the 
specific cases in question.
104
 Moreover, our approach also follows the principles of J.S. Mill’s 
method of agreement, which establishes that cases sharing a common outcome also share 
common hypothesized causal factors, despite varying in other significant ways.
105
  
 In the context of a comparative historical analysis, a deterministic explanation relies on 
conditions that are either necessary or sufficient causes, or both, in an effort to explain the 
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occurrence of an outcome, at least within the specified cases.
106
 According to Mill’s method of 
agreement, the outcome of interest will be present in all cases; and thus, it is logically 
impossible for any hypothesized cause not shared by the cases to be individually necessary for 
the outcome’s occurrence.107 More precisely, with necessary cause the absence of cause x is 
always associated with the absence of outcome y; however, the presence of cause x does not 
imply that outcome y will occur. With sufficient cause the presence of cause x is always 
associated with the occurrence of outcome y; however, another cause (z) may alternatively 
cause outcome y, and therefore the presence of y does not imply the presence of x. Only when 
a variable has a necessary and sufficient cause will the outcome always be present when the 
cause is present, and always absent when the cause is absent.
108
 Mill’s method of agreement 
dictates that a single deviation from a hypothesised pattern of necessary or sufficient causation 
is enough to eliminate a given factor as a potential cause.
109
 Therefore, because our historical 
comparative analysis only involves two cases, and the hypothesized causal variable and the 
outcome are present in both cases, we can argue that our causal variable is both necessary and 
sufficient.
110
 
However, our comparative analysis is not based solely on a linear historical 
explanation of the causal effect of our hypothesized explanatory variable. It also involves an 
examination of the ‘causal mechanism’ that links the explanatory variable to the dependent 
variable.
111
 We identify the causal mechanism as being the instrumantalization and continued 
use of key shared memories and symbols on the part of Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
academics and elites (political leaders, social activists, etc.). It is through the employment of 
these shared memories and their symbolic representations that Flemish and Québécois 
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nationalists are able to maintain the collective conceptualization of their respective ethno-
linguistic national identities, in terms of being in a constant state of peril and struggle, which is 
defined by the tenets of the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest developed in Flanders and 
Québec. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the key shared memories and symbols that have a 
direct causal effect on the dependant variable—the nationalist profile of the contemporary 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. Consequently, we employ a historical 
comparative analysis technique of causal inference known as ‘process tracing’, permitting us 
to analyze shared memories and symbols as the causal mechanism.       
 
2.2 Process Tracing 
The key element of a historical comparative analysis is establishing the causal 
association between the explanatory variable and the outcome variable. However, for our 
purposes, identifying the causal mechanism that explains how and why the explanatory 
variable is determinant for the outcome variable is of equal importance.
112
 Therefore, our 
historical comparative analysis relies on a method referred to as ‘process tracing’. The 
advantage of using process tracing is that it offers the capacity to marshal many observations 
to support deductive claims regarding linkages in a causal chain.
113
 In general terms, a method 
of process tracing is aimed at generating and analyzing data on the causal mechanisms and 
other intervening variables that link putative causes to observed effects.
114
 This is ideal for our 
endeavour in that we attempt to define an antecedent variable that can be traced to the 
development of the explanatory variable, which, in turn, has a causal effect on our outcome 
variable through the agency of a causal mechanism.  
 Process tracing is also often used when analysing a small number of cases to avoid 
mistaking a spurious correlation for a causal association. A spurious correlation arises when 
the explanatory and outcome variables appear to be causally related, but, in fact, the presence 
of an antecedent variable explains away the presumed causal relationship between the 
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hypothesized explanatory and outcome variables.
115
 As a means of ensuring that there is not a 
spurious correlation in our analysis, we establish the presence of a ‘causal chain’ linking an 
antecedent variable to the explanatory variable, which subsequently has a causal relationship 
with the outcome variable. More specifically, the antecedent variable present in our research is 
the historical presence of a linguistically based cultural division of labour in Flanders and 
Québec, which impeded the socio-economic mobility of Dutch-speaking Flemings and 
French-speaking Québécois. The oppositional reaction to this cultural division of labour on the 
part of nationalist academics and elites acted as the seminal force behind the genesis of an 
ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest in Flanders and in Québec, which subsequently helped 
define the conception of the Flemish and Québécois nations.   
 Therefore, through process tracing we seek to establish a causal association between 
the antecedent variable and the dependent variable through the agency of the explanatory 
variable; thus creating a ‘causal chain’, which is linked together by the effect of a ‘causal 
mechanism’.116 As previously mentioned, our theory proposes that the causal mechanism is 
the perpetuation of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and related conception of the 
collective national identity through the use of key shared memories and symbols on the part of 
Flemish and Québécois nationalists.  
 In our analysis, we use an approach of process tracing referred to as ‘process 
verification’, which involves testing whether the observed processes among variables in the 
cases in question match those predicted by the previously designated theory.
117
 More 
precisely, our approach of process verification seeks to confirm the theorised causal chain, 
linking the socio-economic effects of a linguistically based cultural division of labour, to the 
origins of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest that defines the conception of the national 
identity, which subsequently has had a perpetual causal effect on the national profile through 
the agency of shared memories and symbols. As a means of confirming our theorized causal 
chain, our approach involves a cross-case historical analysis of the Flemish and Québécois 
nationalist movements on a number of different levels. 
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2.3 Structure of Approach  
There are three main phases to our approach: an analysis of the development of both 
nationalist movements, an examination of the contrasting structural and socio-demographic 
factors, and an analysis of key shared memories and symbols. The objective of the first phase 
is to establish the presents and effect of the theorized causal variables, while the second phase 
outlines the alternative influencing factors that would suggest a different outcome, and the 
third phase demonstrates the effect of the causal mechanism.       
To begin with, we examine the development of the contemporary Flemish and 
Québécois nationalist movements though a cross case historical comparative analysis, which 
culminates with an outline of the nationalist profiles of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements. The historical analysis of both nationalist movements is done in the context of 
Miroslav Hroch’s theory on the developmental process of a national movement. From this 
analysis we seek to isolate the similar variables that have affected the development of the 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements; this is to say, a linguistically based cultural 
division of labour, an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, and a similar conception of the 
national identity. More importantly, our comparative analysis explains how in both Flanders 
and Québec, the oppositional reaction to the effects of a cultural division of labour acted as an 
antecedent variable in creating an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, and subsequently the 
conception of national identity. Finally, we highlight the lasting effect of these common 
variables by outlining the paralleling nationalist profiles in Flanders and Québec. 
In the second phase of our approach, we present the structural differences between the 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, including diverging economic and ideological 
principles, differing organizational structures, and a contrasting influence of the Catholic 
Church. Furthermore, we explore the differing socio-demographic, economic, and political 
situations of Flanders and Québec. The objective of this phase of analysis is to highlight the 
various alternative influential factors that would intuitively lead to the assumption that the 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have very different nationalist profiles.  
The third and final phase of our approach examines how shared memoires have acted 
as the casual mechanism, in terms of perpetuating the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements’ conception of an ethno-linguistic nation in peril, which has been defined by the 
tenets of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest. Ultimately, we content that it is this causal 
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effect which explains why the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements continue to 
exhibit similar nationalist profiles. However, based on the parameters of this research project, 
which delimit the length of this dissertation, we focus our analysis on only specific key shared 
memories (and their symbolic linkages) found within the historical narrative of each 
community.  Furthermore, is important to note that our historical comparative analysis is faced 
with certain limitations. For example, although our analysis relies on the large body of 
scholarly inquiry, in both English and French, focused on the Flemish and Québécois 
nationalist movements, our research could have been enhanced by incorporating the wide 
array of research on Flemish nationalism and the Flemish nationalist movement that is 
exclusively available in Dutch.  
Another arguable weakness of our analysis is limiting the focus of the research to only 
two cases. We recognize that it would be more advantageous to broaden the scope of the 
analysis, and include more cases to compare and contrast. Moreover, our research falls into the 
traditional dilemma of being fixated on cases from the ‘Western world’; a constant criticism of 
studies related to nationalism is their ethno-centric and ‘Western’ concentration. A richer 
comparison would undoubtedly include cases of nationalism and nationalist movements in 
Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East. However, it should be noted that this dissertation is 
structured in accordance with pre-established parameters of length, and therefore a more wide-
ranged study encompassing other cases for analysis and comparison would not be feasible 
under the circumstances.  
Accepting these analytical limitations, it should be reiterated that the principal 
objective of our approach is the case specific explanation of why the Flemish and Québécois 
nationalist movements share very similar profiles concerning their nationalist discourse and 
objectives, despite the presence of clear socio-demographic and structural differences; and 
thus, we are not concerned with establishing a causal variable that can be applied universally. 
At the same time, we establish a model of analysis based on identifying a casual chain, which 
defines the present nature of a nationalist movement by analysing both the factors influencing 
its origin, and the causal mechanism maintaining its nature. Therefore, our approach could 
provide a template for future applications in explaining the nature and development of other 
nationalist movements.  
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Part II  
Development of the Flemish and Québécois Nationalist Movements 
 In chapter 3, we provide a cross case historical comparative analysis of the 
development of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. This analysis highlights 
the fact that both nationalist movements are rooted in an ‘ethno-linguistic nationalism of 
protest’, which was originally promoted by Flemish and Québécois nationalists as a means of 
redressing socio-economic inequalities that resulted from the presence of a ‘cultural division 
of labour’ in Flanders and in Québec.118 Ultimately, it is our contention that as a direct result 
of the commonality in their expression of nationalism and in the conceptualization of their 
national identities, both the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements presently maintain 
similar nationalist profiles.  
 However, as Chapter 4 will point out, the development of both nationalist movements 
has been influenced by very distinctive elements; for example, the Flemish nationalist 
movement has been framed within a liberal Christian-democratic political ideology, while the 
nationalist movement in Québec has traditionally been based on leftist and secular 
principles.
119
 Moreover, the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements are 
contextualized by differing organizational structures, which are present within states having 
very different socio-demographic and political realities. 
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Chapter 3  
Cross Case Historical Analysis of the Flemish and Québécois Nationalist Movements 
  The following chapter presents a cross case historical analysis, exploring the genesis 
and developmental phases of both nationalist movements. The purpose of this analysis is to 
highlight the common effect of the linguistically based cultural division of labour that was 
historically present in Flanders and in Quebec, as a means of explaining the origins of the 
paralleling expressions of Flemish and Québécois nationalism, which subsequently have led to 
the similar nationalist profiles of both nationalist movements.  
 
3.1 Impact of the First World War and the Flemish Front Movement 
  The origins of Flemish nationalism, as a movement of literary inquiry into the Flemish 
identity and culture (or what Miroslav Hroch refers to as ‘Phase A’ of the developmental 
process of national movements), can be traced back to the years immediately following 
Belgium’s independence in 1830. It was during this time that Flemish literature written in 
Dutch was marginalized by the Francophone elite in Belgium, leading to an increasing 
awareness of a separate Flemish identity among Dutch-speakers.
120
  
 The most influential book of this era, “The Lion of Flanders,” was written by Hendrik 
Conscience in 1838, and it sought to foster Flemish pride and self respect within the context of 
a Belgian national identity.
121
 However, it would be the First World War that would usher in 
an evolution of the Vlaamse Beweging (Flemish Movement), as it transitioned from simply 
being devoted to the cultivation and protection of the Dutch language and Flemish culture in 
Belgium, to a nationalist agitation and propagation of a Flemish national identity.  
 This evolution of the Flemish Movement would be initiated by the development of the 
Frontbeweging (Flemish Front Movement) during the First World War, helping to transform 
the Flemish Movement into a socio-political movement of nationalist agitation, and driving 
Flemish nationalism towards becoming a popular mass movement within Flemish society. In 
fact, the ‘Great War’ would have a profound impact on the collective conscious of the Flemish 
community, influencing the Flemish nationalist movement right up until the present day.  
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 There was a profound resentment from Flemish soldiers during the First World War 
over the fact that the Belgian army was in practice a French institution, which acted as the 
catalyst for the development of a nationalist agitation aimed at building an awareness of a 
Flemish identity. The Francophone nature of the Belgian army of the day existed despite a law 
passed in 1913, which mandated that the army use both French and Dutch. Nevertheless, the 
vast majority of Belgian officers during the First World War were Francophones who gave 
their orders exclusively in French, and who were often openly discriminatory towards Dutch-
speaking troops. Conversely, there was an over-representation of the Flemings in the Belgian 
regular army in the first years of the First World War, which only grew as the war progressed; 
going from 60 percent at the beginning of the conflict, to 72 percent in the latter half of the 
war. Moreover, 80 percent of the frontline troops were Flemish, and most of those were poorly 
educated Dutch-speaking labourers and farm workers, whose inability to understand French 
orders had fatal consequences in battle.
122
 The conscripted Flemish soldiers were given 
instruction in French as part of their initial training; however, because so many of them were 
uneducated country teenagers, this practice was often a futile effort.
123
 
 As a means of battling against the isolation of being within an essentially French-
speaking Belgian army, the Dutch-speaking soldiers, along with Flemish priests, teachers, and 
students (who were serving in the army as stretcher-bearers or orderlies), organized a vibrant 
social and cultural life among themselves. These groups were intellectually oriented, 
discussing Flemish literature and with the goal of establishing Flemish solidarity. However, 
senior Belgian officers were fearful that this solidarity among Flemish soldiers could result in 
a vulnerability to German influence, and thus took disciplinary action by banning any 
semblance of political organization within the army and the publishing of pamphlets, which 
often recounted the discriminatory action of the Francophone officers.
124
  
 By 1917, despite the attempted suppression, most of the individual Flemish societies 
that formed on the front came together under the official name of De Frontbeweging (the 
Front Movement). Originally, the Front Movement was dedicated to the recognition of 
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Flemish vitality and culture, but it eventually radicalized to the point that some members 
began to call for Flemish independence from Belgium. The Front Movement would transcend 
the trenches of the First World War, greatly impacting Flemish society, and subsequently 
influencing the greater Flemish Movement during the German occupation. This Flemish 
nationalist agitation coming from the frontline soldiers eventually developed into an important 
political movement, dramatically shaping Flemish nationalism.
125
 
As a direct result of the stories of discrimination coming from the front, several letters 
were written by flamingant
126
 activists to King Albert I, demanding the legal rights of the 
Flemish be recognized when the war was over. In 1916, after the Belgian government publicly 
refused to make the University of Ghent a Dutch-speaking institution after the war, the leaders 
of the Front Movement approved a motion allowing the occupying German administration to 
establish the university for them. At the end of 1916, the Flemish ‘frontists’ created their own 
political party, the Frontpartij (Front Party), followed by the creation of a Council of Flanders 
in 1917, which was geared towards working with the occupying German administration in 
Belgium to establish the administrative separation of Flanders from Wallonia.
127
        
The German administration of occupied Belgium during the First World War 
implemented a ‘divide and rule’ policy of rapprochement with the Flemish community, known 
as Flamenpolitik. This policy would have a profound influence in shaping the Flemish 
Movement during the First World War (as it would again years later during the Second World 
War). In 1917, the German military governor of Belgium, Moritz Von Bissing, convened a 
commission to organize the division of the country. In a decree, Von Bissing separated 
Belgium into two administrative areas: Flanders and Wallonia. This measure would have a 
lasting impact on both Flemish and Walloon nationalists, and acted as the germination for later 
claims to create a federal Belgian state.
128
 The influence of the German policy of 
Flamenpolitik on the Flemish nationalist movement (during both world wars) cannot be 
overemphasised; and although the policy was an overall failure in terms of dividing the 
general Belgian public’s loyalties during the First World War (Flemings included), it did show 
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Flemish nationalists, especially those involved with the Front Movement, that the idea of their 
own governance was obtainable, and it also reinforced the idea of a Flemish identity apart 
from a Belgian one.
129
  
In the immediate aftermath of victory in the First World War, there was a resurgence of 
Belgian patriotism within much of the Flemish community, including a high level of 
popularity for King Albert and pride in the Belgian colonial empire. But the nationalist 
agitation of the Front Movement would continue to encourage the development of Flemish 
nationalism. For many Flemings, patriotism and loyalty towards the nation would shift from 
Belgium to Flanders; and in the 1930s, the idea of a Flemish nation would become an 
indubitable fact.
130
  
The treatment of Dutch-speaking soldiers by French-speaking officers in the Belgian 
army during the First World War, and the fact that most of the frontline troops were Flemings, 
exemplified the effect of a linguistic cultural division of labour that was present in Belgium at 
the time. The First World War would exacerbate Flemish nationalists’ frustration with a 
Belgian state that was effectively controlled by a Francophone bourgeoisie, thus serving as a 
catalyst for the establishment of a Flemish ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest. In fact, the 
creation of shared memories embodying Flemish frustrations during the First World War 
would take shape very early on, and a prime example of this is the story of the brothers Van 
Raemdonck. Historical evidence indicates that Frans Van Raemdonck died in a heated battle 
during the First World War while cradling a dying Walloon soldier, Aimé Fiévez. However, in 
disseminating the shared memories of Frans Van Raemdonck’s death, Flemish Frontists 
substituted Fiévez for Frans Van Raemdonck’s brother, Edward. But history tells us that, 
although Edward had died in the same pitched battle as his brother Frans, he did not do so in 
Frans’s arms.131 Nevertheless, the shared memories of the Van Raemdonck brothers would 
become entrenched in the collective memory of Flemings, taking the form of stories and 
poems, many of which are still influential within the Flemish nationalist movement today.  
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3.2 La Révolution Tranquille: French-Canadian Nationalism to Québécois Nationalism  
 In Québec, the First World War, as well as the Second World War, would also be a 
flash point for tension, as Francophones in Québec staunchly opposed being conscripted to 
fight in what many viewed as being wars of British imperialist design.
132
 However, the 
conflict over the question of the conscription in Québec during the First and Second World 
Wars would primarily stimulate reflections by the Francophone intelligentsia on French-
Canadian nationalism. It would not be until the nationalist agitation during the Révolution 
Tranquille (Quiet Revolution) of the 1960s that a widespread sense of a Québécois national 
identity began to take hold among Francophones in Québec. This sentiment of Québécois 
nationalism would replace what had previously been a pan-Canadian ideal of French-Canadian 
nationalism. 
 In the period immediately following the end of the Second World War, efforts at 
modernizing Québec society were held back by the socio-economic policies of politicians and 
the Catholic Church’s position on education. During this time, Québec was governed by the 
Union nationale government of Maurice Duplessis, which was focused on establishing the 
economic autonomy of the province by relying on American and Canadian Anglophone 
private investment, while leaving the Catholic Church to essentially remain in control over the 
social development of Québec society.
133
 The policies of the Duplessis government pushed for 
the provincial autonomy of Québec in the name of what had been traditional French-Canadian 
nationalism, and Duplessis relied on the power and hierarchical structure of the Catholic 
Church to establish the social values of Québec society.
134
  
 This dominant role of the Catholic Church in Québec had been established following 
the British ‘Conquest’ of New France in 1760, and the implementation of the Québec Act of 
1774, which allowed the Church to impose tithes, as well as build and staff educational and 
welfare institutions.
135
 Furthermore, economic power in Québec was effectively in 
Anglophone hands, with Francophone elites being more heavily concentrated in the liberal 
professions and the clergy. Anglophone control over Québec’s economy and commercial 
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activity began soon after the Conquest and continued into the 1800s, when industrialization 
was introduced to Québec by Anglophones financed by British capital. Then during the first 
half of the twentieth century, a shift to the United States as the dominant source of capital and 
the primary trade partner of Québec only further weakened the position of Francophones 
within the Quebec economy.
136
 Due primarily to the lack of resources available to 
Francophones in Québec, there was a clear segmentation of occupations.
137
 Increasingly, 
Francophones were restricted to blue-collar jobs in Québec and found themselves working in 
enterprises owned by English-Canadians and Americans, in which the managerial jobs were 
filled by Québec’s Anglophone population. Census data from 1961 showed that even with 
comparable levels of education, Francophones in Québec occupied less significant positions in 
the economy than did Anglophones.
138
 Thus, the imposition of a cultural division of labour in 
Québec can be traced back to the late seventeenth century, only to be exacerbated by an 
uneven development of industrialization, and continuing through to the first half of the 
twentieth century.     
 However, the status quo in Québec society would be challenged by the emergence of a 
‘neo-nationalist’ intelligentsia in Québec, which called for social mobilization against the 
laissez-faire economic policies of the Duplessis government, and against the social domination 
of Québec society by the Catholic clergy. This neo-nationalist movement pushed for a policy 
of ‘secular statistism’, in which the Québec ‘state’ was to become the motor behind economic 
development and social change, with the principal objective being the empowerment and 
amelioration of Francophones in Québec.
139
  
 It would be Québec’s Liberal Party that initially gave this emerging Québécois 
nationalism a political voice, after the party won the 1960 provincial elections and enacted the 
social and economic reforms that essentially sparked the ‘Quiet Revolution’. The objective of 
these reforms was a progressive economic emancipation of French-speaking Québécois, and 
an affirmation of the Québécois national identity. Moreover, Québécois nationalism would 
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replace Catholicism’s role within Québec society as the galvanizing force that was able to 
rally and mobilize Francophones.
140
  
 Amidst this period of the Quiet Revolution in Québec during the 1960s, a number of 
nationalist and ‘independentist’ organizations were established, for example the Ralliement 
National (RN) and the Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale (RIN). The RIN was 
notably a movement of nationalist psychology, using propaganda and disseminating 
information during manifestations and within publications as a means of creating nationalist 
agitation, in an effort to diffuse the ideal of a Québécois nation and the independence of 
Québec.
141
 This nationalist agitation during the Quiet Revolution resulted in Francophones in 
Québec increasingly identifying themselves as Québécois, transitioning away from the idea of 
being ‘French-Canadian’, and subsequently viewing Québec as the ‘state’ irrevocably linked 
to the Québécois nation.
142
 Therefore, in following Miroslav Hroch’s approach to the study of 
national movements, the ‘awakening’ of the Québécois national identity can be described as 
the transition to ‘Phase B’ of the Québécois nationalist movement’s development.  
 Despite the discrepancy in the timeline of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements’ transition from ‘Phase A’ to ‘Phase B’ of development (Phase B being the 
nationalist agitation leading to an ‘identity awakening’ of the contemporary conception of the 
nation), the nationalist agitation that developed within both societies embodied an ethno-
linguistic nationalism of protest, and was similarly aimed at overcoming the socio-economic 
limitations of an imposed cultural division of labour. This shared characteristic attributing to 
the ‘identity awakening’ of the Flemish and Québécois nations is a key variable as to why the 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements maintain similar nationalist profiles to this day. 
The ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and conception of the national identity, which 
originated as an oppositional response to a cultural division of labour, would be perpetuated 
overtime in Flanders and Québec, as both nationalist movements evolved socio-politically in 
capturing mass appeal.     
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3.3 Rise of the Contemporary Flemish Nationalist Movement and Belgian Federalism  
 In the years following the Second World War, the Flemish Movement became 
relatively dormant. This was primarily due to the stigma of Nazi collaboration, which was 
caused by the close association of some Flamingant groups with the Nazis during the 
occupation of Belgium. However, the Flemish Movement would become revitalized in the 
1950s, when a renewed interest in Flemish social and economic issues came to the forefront, 
and as the Flemish economy was catching up to the Walloon economy, which was suffering 
from slowing industry. Flanders would see growth in economic development and improved 
living standards during this period. There was also an expansion of higher education, and more 
and more Flemish workers remained in Flanders rather than migrating to Wallonia, with the 
call coming from Flemish nationalists for Flemings to “Work in our own Region”.143 
The 1950s would also see the Flemish Movement galvanize politically. In 1952, the 
Flemish nationalist organization and pressure group Vlaamse Volksbeweging (VVB) was 
established, and over the course of the 1950s and beyond, the VVB would shape the Flemish 
Movement’s calls for Belgian federalism, educational reform, and Flemish cultural 
autonomy.
144
 Coinciding with the formation of the VVB, an electoral alliance of Flemish 
nationalists entered elections under the name of Christelijke Vlaamse Volksunie (Christian 
Flemish People’s Union) in 1954. The party’s name soon changed to the Volksunie (People’s 
Union), with the party’s platform being centred on the federalization of the Belgian state.145 
Thereafter, the Volksunie became a part of the Belgian electoral landscape, and although the 
party would win only a single seat in the 1954 legislative elections, it would rapidly gain in 
support throughout the 1960s. This period would signal the final stage of development of the 
Flemish national movement (what Hroch refers to as ‘Phase C’), as the social and political 
well-being of the Flemish nation became the concern of the majority of the population in 
Flanders. 
By the 1960s, the Flemish economy had surpassed the stagnating Walloon economy; 
and as a result, wallingant (the term used in Belgium to describe Walloon nationalists) leaders 
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sought to protect the Walloon social-democratic economic model, while Flamingants were 
more preoccupied with assuring the cultural independence and the linguistic territoriality of 
Flanders, including Brussels and its periphery, which were becoming more and more French-
speaking.
146
 In 1962, a law was passed defining the linguistic borders in Belgium between the 
Dutch-speaking and French-speaking communities. However, the law granted special facilities 
to linguistic minorities in a few border regions, including parts of Greater Brussels, which 
subsequently created resentment among Flemish proponents of the territorial integrity of 
Dutch unilingualism in Flanders.
147
 There was the sentiment among Flamingants that allowing 
for French language facilities in Flemish territory would perpetuate the intrusion of French in 
Flanders.
148
  
The tensions between Dutch and French speakers in Belgium, along with Flemish 
nationalist agitation, hit a high-water mark during the conflict over the linguistic future of 
what had been the bilingual Catholic University of Leuven, located in Flemish Brabant. 
Flemish nationalists demanded a transfer of French faculties at the University of Leuven to 
their own institution in Wallonia, while the French students and professors were determined to 
stay put.
149
 In 1965, the Walloon general secretary of the Catholic University of Leuven 
suggested publicly that Leuven was one of the points of the ‘academic triangle’ of a future 
bilingual ‘Grand Brussels’. The result was mass demonstrations by Flemish students, with the 
rally cry of “Walen Buiten!” (Walloons Get-out!). The students were supported by Flemish 
professors and Flamingant politicians, and the protests would become more and more violent 
over the course of the late 1960s.
150
 In the end, the student unrest over the Catholic University 
of Leuven brought down the Belgian government at the time in February 1968, and eventually 
a French-speaking university called l’Université Catholique de Louvain was moved 
to Louvain-la-Neuve, twenty kilometres southeast of Brussels, where French is the official 
language. In the wake of the crisis over the University of Leuven, political parties in Belgium 
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split along linguistic and national lines, and the 1968 election would signal the emergence of 
the Flemish nationalist Volksunie as a viable political party.
151
  
By the late 1960s, Flemish nationalism had developed into the dominant socio-political 
and ideological force within Flemish society. The Flemish Movement’s demand for full 
cultural autonomy could no longer be ignored. Eventually, there was what would be the first 
of many revisions to the Belgian Constitution in 1970, resulting in the establishment of three 
cultural communities: the Dutch Cultural Community, the French Cultural Community, and 
the German Cultural Community. The constitutional revision of 1970 also laid the foundation 
for the establishment of three administrative ‘regions’, which was in direct response to 
Flemish nationalists’ demands for cultural autonomy, and in reaction to the calls for economic 
autonomy by both Walloon nationalists and the French-speaking inhabitants of Brussels.
152
  
 Since the 1970 changes to the Belgian Constitution, there have been four additional 
state reforms increasing the federative nature of Belgium. In 1980, the three cultural 
communities became simply referred to as ‘communities’, and the Flemish Community, the 
French Community, and the German Community were each granted a legislative council and 
government.
153
 These communities continued to decide on cultural matters, but also dealt with 
matters relating to the ‘individual’ (namely health and social services). Moreover, the 1980 
state reform also granted a legislative council and government to the Flemish and Walloon 
Regions. Immediately following the 1980 phase of constitutional reform, the Flemings had 
their regional legislative council and government transfer its competencies to the community 
legislative council and government, thus establishing an integral state structure in Flanders 
that had competence over cultural, language, and educational affairs, as well as responsibility 
for regional economic matters. Flemish nationalist governments subsequently used this sub-
state structure as a means of obtaining their long desired cultural autonomy, as well as a large 
measure of political autonomy. Conversely, the French-speaking population did not choose to 
merge the institutions of the French Community and the Walloon Region.
154
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 In 1988-89, the Belgian Constitution was again amended to give additional 
responsibilities to the regions and communities. The most sweeping change was the 
devolution of nearly all responsibilities for educational matters to the communities. The 
regions and communities were also provided additional revenue, and the Brussels Region was 
given its own legislative assembly and executive.
155
 Then in the summer of 1993, the previous 
state reforms would be consolidated, transitioning Belgium into a fully-fledged federal state. 
This fourth round of changes to the Belgian state also reformed the bicameral parliamentary 
system and provided for the direct election of the members of the community and regional 
legislative councils. The bilingual Brabant province was split into separate Flemish Brabant 
and Walloon Brabant provinces; however, the electoral and judicial arrondissement of 
Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) was not split, which, until very recently, continued to be a 
source of political tension. Finally in 2001, the Lambermont and Lombard Accords were 
passed in Belgium. The Lambermont Accord transferred more powers and taxation rights to 
the linguistic communities and to the regions, while the Lombard Accord granted guaranteed 
representation for the Flemish inhabitants of Brussels in the Parliament of the Brussels-Capital 
Region.
156
 
 The nationalist agitation of the Flemish Movement, and the subsequent push for the 
devolution of power to Flanders, led to a substantially autonomous Flemish sub-state structure 
being established within a Belgian Federation. In fact, after the 1993 state reform, the 
nationalist government in Flanders at the time affirmed that, “The deepening of Flemish 
autonomy is a natural process.”157 The Flemish Movement had essentially obtained political 
control over the region of Flanders and the solidarity of the Flemish nation. However, despite 
the numerous constitutional revisions, there remains a lot of political tension between French 
speakers and Dutch speakers in Belgium, and the voice of those Flamingants who insist that a 
fully independent Flanders is still necessary has only grown louder.  
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3.4 Political Development of the Flemish Movement 
In 1977, radical far-right factions within the Volksunie political party were incensed 
over the concessions given to Francophones in Brussels and in the Flemish Brabant, which 
were made as part of the Egmont agreement on the federalization of Belgium. These 
Flamingant hardliners in the Volksunie united with other far-right nationalist groups to form 
the far-right party Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block).
158
 By 1978, the Vlaams Blok was the most 
notable militant right-wing party of the Flemish Movement, embracing a Christian 
conservative Flemish nationalism, emphasizing an anti-immigration platform, and calling for 
the independence of Flanders. The Vlaams Blok quickly began to gain ground in the Flemish 
and Belgian parliamentary elections, with election campaigns consisting mainly of an anti-
immigration and law-and-order platform, combined with the desire for full Flemish autonomy 
and eventual independence.
159
 However, all of the major Flemish political parties were 
reluctant to enter into coalitions with the Vlaams Blok, due to the party’s far right-wing 
tendencies; and following a 1992 agreement between all of the other Flemish political parties, 
known as the cordon sanitaire (sanitary cordon), the Vlaams Blok was effectively blocked 
from entering into any level of government.
160
 
In 2000, what had historically been the principal Flemish nationalist party, Volksunie, 
dissolved as a result of escalating internal conflicts, splitting into two new parties: Spirit, and 
N-VA or Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance). Both parties initially tried their 
luck in a cartel with another larger Flemish political party; N-VA allying with the Christian 
democrats of CD&V, and Spirit with the Flemish socialists of SP.a. But by 2004, the Vlaams 
Blok had arguably become the single most popular Flemish party in Belgium, having the 
support of about one in four of the Flemish electorate, as well as being one of the most 
successful radical right-wing populist parties in all of Europe. However, in April 2004, the 
Belgian Court of Cassation ruled that some of the party's affiliated organizations had breached 
a 1981 anti-racism law, and that it sanctioned discrimination. The ruling was made definitive 
on November 9
th
, 2004, and the Vlaams Blok shortly after reorganized itself as the Vlaams 
Belang (Flemish Interest), which took the lead as the most popular Flemish nationalist party in 
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Belgium, and quickly began securing the support of almost one in four of the Flemish 
electorate.
161
  
The Vlaams Belang (VB) has since sought to change its image from a radical right-
wing party to a more conservative party, and has tried to distance itself from some of its 
former more extreme programs. Nevertheless, most other parties have extended the cordon 
sanitaire to apply to the Vlaams Belang, effectively preventing the party from any executive 
power; however, the VB contested the 2006 municipal elections on the theme of “Secure, 
Flemish, Liveable”, and obtained a massive increase of votes, seeing its council members 
almost double from 439 to nearly 800.  
This viable far-right political element within the Flemish nationalist movement is very 
much a differentiating characteristic from the Québécois nationalist movement, indicative of 
the ideological cleavage between the rightist-Christian conservative nature of the Flemish 
Movement and the leftist secular nature of the nationalist movement in Québec. In the Belgian 
general election of June 2010, the right-wing Flemish separatist N-VA became the biggest 
party in Flanders, and even in Belgium as a whole, receiving 17.4 percent of the vote for the 
Belgian House of Representatives (3.96 percent higher than the second place Walloon socialist 
political party, the Parti Socialiste), and capturing 19.61 percent of the vote for the Senate.
162
 
The enormous growth of N-VA is generally explained as being caused by an influx of 
‘moderate’ Flemish voters, who do not necessarily support the party’s eventual aim of Flemish 
independence, but do want consistent and far-reaching reforms with greater autonomy for 
Flanders, something they no longer trust the traditional parties to be able to achieve.   
The N-VA has arguably emerged as the main political force behind the Flemish 
nationalist movement, with the Vlaams Blok still appealing to more hard-line radical 
nationalists. However, despite the fact the Flanders has obtained considerable political 
autonomy and controls all matters concerning culture, education, and language in the region, 
the N-VA still maintains an adherence to an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest by 
continually making referenced to the injustices of the past.
163
 This has notably been the case 
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for the current leader of the N-VA, Bart de Wever, who constantly evokes shared memories of 
the historic injustices inflicted on the Flemish nation in the context of justifying present day 
Flemish nationalist objectives. For example, at a conference in Inverness, Scotland put on by 
the Scottish Nationalist Party in October 2011, de Wever included the following statement in 
his speech:   
“It [Belgium] was a centralized francophone nation, ruled by a francophone elite that 
dominated the majority of poor, illiterate and non-French speaking Flemings through 
censitary suffrage. This electoral system excluded most Flemings from the democratic process 
and sentenced them to a life in the social, economic and cultural margins of the state.”  
 
“But the struggle for universal suffrage would become a critical juncture for this new nation-
state, the point where the paths of the Flemings and the French speaking Belgians would start 
to part. Universal suffrage introduced the Flemish masse into the democracy and sparked the 
struggle for equal rights, for the abolishment of linguistic barriers and for social justice. The 
French speaking elite reluctantly accepted the Flemish demands for reform and tried to 
temper the effects in every way. Which caused Flemish public opinion to radicalize.”   
 
“And so a pattern emerged that remains vibrant until this day. The French speaking minority 
fears becoming democratically out weighted by the Flemish majority. So they try to 
discourage every attempt to reform.”164   
  
  
3.5 The Parti Québécois and the Sovereignty Movement  
In 1967, the congress of the Liberal Party of Québec rejected a proclamation calling for 
a sovereign Québec in a new Canadian union. The rejection of this proclamation led to the 
departure of a number of Québec nationalists from the Québec Liberal Party, including René 
Lévesque, who would go on to form their own party that same year, le Mouvement 
Souveraineté-Association (the Sovereignty-Association Movement).
165
 Then in October 1968, 
following negotiations with the RN and the RIN, the fusion of the sovereigntist organizations 
occurred, establishing the Parti Québécois (PQ). The PQ proposed a less radical form of 
sovereignty for Québec, rather than the independence ‘at any cost’ that had previously been 
touted.
166
 In fact, the PQ called for a ‘sovereignty-association’ with the rest of Canada based 
on the desire to see Québec become a state and member of the United Nations, as well as the 
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desire to assure the economic and social standing of Francophones Québécois, and preserve 
and protect French as the predominant language in Québec.
167
  
Essentially, the Québécois nationalist movement had entered its final stage of 
development (‘Phase C’) with the creation of the PQ; and in the 1970 Québec provincial 
election, the PQ obtained 24 percent of the vote, resulting in the election of six deputies to the 
Assemblée nationale (National Assembly), Québec’s provincial legislature. Then in 1976, the 
PQ won the provincial election by having seventy-one deputies being elected and the party 
gaining 41 percent of the vote.
168
 After obtaining political power in Québec, the PQ passed an 
important law in 1977 called the Charter of the French Language (also commonly known as 
Bill 101), which defined French as the only official language of Québec, and established 
fundamental language rights and a language policy.  
Although nationalism in Québec was not solely defined by the idea of sovereignty 
during this time, the victory of the PQ was indicative of the fact that the sovereigntist 
movement had taken the lead in terms of being the predominant focus of the Québécois 
nationalist movement. It was also evident that Québec nationalism had become fully 
entrenched as a widespread socio-political force within Québec society, centralized around the 
PQ.  
At its seventh national convention from June 1
st
 to 3
rd
, 1979, the members of the PQ 
adopted a strategy for a referendum on the sovereignty of Québec. They then began an 
aggressive effort to promote the idea of ‘sovereignty-association’ by providing details of how 
the economic relations with the rest of Canada would include free trade between Canada and 
Quebec, common tariffs against imports, and a common currency. In addition, joint political 
institutions would be established to administer these economic arrangements. Sovereignty-
Association was proposed to the population of Quebec in the 1980 ‘Québec referendum’, 
resulting in the proposal being rejected by 60 percent of the Quebec electorate; however, the 
period following the referendum would only serve to solidify the Québec sovereignty 
movement as the principal force of the Québécois nationalist movement.  
In the aftermath of the 1980 Québec Referendum, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau began discussions of constitutional renewal. Québec wanted to see changes to the 
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structure of federal power in relation to the provinces, including an ‘opt out’ clause for federal 
programs with equivalent funding being given to the provinces, as well as Québec’s right to 
veto any constitutional amendments specifically affecting the province. However, in 
November 1981, an agreement was reached between Prime Minister Trudeau and the leaders 
of all of Canada’s provinces except Québec on the text concerning the ‘patriation’ of Canada’s 
Constitution, which would make it strictly under Canadian jurisdiction, rather than part of 
British law as it had been in the form of the 1867 British North America Act. On April 17, 
1982, Queen Elisabeth II signed the Canada Constitution Act into law without Québec as a 
signatory to the document.  
 The 1982 Constitution Act was followed by two failed attempts to get Québec’s 
consent to the Constitution. The first attempt was in 1987, in the form of the Meech Lake 
Accord, which proposed amendments to the 1982 Constitution aimed at obtaining Québec’s 
endorsement of it and increasing support in Québec for remaining within Canada. The Meech 
Lake Accord was put forth by Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and the ten provincial 
premiers at the time, including the Premier of Québec Robert Bourassa. However, the accord 
was unable to be ratified before the predetermined deadline in 1990, and its rejection re-
energized support for Québec sovereignty. In fact, in the fallout from the failure of the Meech 
Lake Accord, several Québec Members of Parliament from the federal Progressive 
Conservative and Liberal parties followed the federal Environment Minister, Lucien Bouchard, 
in the forming of a new federal party, the Bloc Québécois (BQ), whose main platform was the 
promotion of the Québec sovereignty movement in Canada’s Parliament. In the 1993 
Canadian federal election, the BQ won fifty-four out of the seventy-five seats in Québec, 
which resulted in the BQ becoming the official opposition in the Canadian Parliament.
169
     
 The second attempt at resolving the constitutional rift between Canada and Québec 
would come in 1992, with the Charlottetown Accord. This time the constitutional amendments 
would be submitted to a Canada-wide public referendum on October 26 of that year; however, 
the accord was resoundingly defeated in Québec and in the rest of Canada.
170
 In the aftermath 
of the Charlottetown Accord—the second failed attempt at obtaining Québec’s formal consent 
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to the 1982 Canadian Constitution—the Québec sovereignty movement regained its role as the 
dominant force behind Québec’s nationalist movement. During the 1994 Québec provincial 
election, there was a renewed commitment by the Parti Québécois to hold a second 
referendum on Québec’s sovereignty. This referendum would eventually come to fruition in 
October of 1995, and the results of this second sovereignty referendum would be a lot closer 
than the first, with 49.4 percent voting for sovereignty, while 50.58 percent voted against it. 
 Despite the fact that the 1995 referendum on Québec sovereignty was defeated, it was 
done so by less than one percent, with the majority of Francophones (60 percent) having voted 
in favour of sovereignty; and thus, Québec’s sovereignty came to be regarded as an obtainable 
possibility.
171
 As a consequence, Québec nationalists have maintained their motivation to 
continue the debate over the very idea of sovereignty, and the issue continues to dominate the 
Québec nationalist discourse.
172
 The issue of sovereignty also remains the focal point of the 
Parti Québécois, and the Québec sovereignty movement is still relatively synonymous with 
the Québec nationalist movement. 
  
3.6 Contemporary Profile of the Flemish and Québécois Nationalist Movements  
The contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have both sought to 
impose a political and institutional recognition of their national identity on the Belgian and 
Canadian states respectively, regardless of the fact that such a measure of identity recognition 
goes against said states’ own ideal of national identity. 173  Subsequently, both nationalist 
movements have engaged in a form of contentious identity politics with the perceived 
opposing nations (French-Speaking Walloons and English-Speaking Canadians); and thus, 
both nationalist movements are largely defined by the continuous conflictual interactions with 
these other nations.
174
  
The nationalist discourse of both nationalist movements has been shaped by the 
advocacy of political mobilization to remove the historic limitations on the social mobility of 
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Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium and French-speaking Québécois in Canada, as well as 
the preservation and protection of the Flemish and Québécois linguistic-culture. In present 
terms, however, this call to political mobilization is dominated by political actors claiming that 
the separation of Flanders and Québec from their current federal state structures (Belgium and 
Canada respectively) is the only means of ensuring the vitality of the language and culture of 
the Flemish and Québécois peoples. Furthermore, Flemish and Québec separatists envision the 
current federal systems in Belgium and Canada as being replaced by a ‘partnership’ or 
‘association’ between independent states.  
Because nationalists in Flanders and in Québec have an ethno-linguistic conception of 
their respective nations, language is at the heart of Flemish and Québébcois nationalism. As a 
result, the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements are focused on national territoriality 
and national community, which are both greatly defined by language. The nationalist rhetoric 
in Flanders and Québec is also contextualized in language and shaped by history, or more 
specifically the shared memories and symbols of past injustices suffered by the Flemish and 
Québécois nations; most notably the limitation on socio-economic mobility, which was caused 
by the imposition of a linguistically defined ‘cultural division of labour’ at the hands of the 
Francophones of Belgium and the Anglophones of Canada.  
Another key focal point of the nationalist discourse of the Flemish and Québécois 
nationalist movements is the linguistic situation in Brussels and Montréal, which are viewed as 
being the epicentres of the linguistic conflict in Flanders and Québec respectively. Brussels, a 
city that became a predominantly Francophone enclave within Flanders over the course of the 
twentieth century, is a constant reminder to Flemish nationalists of the historic frenchification 
of Flemings in Belgium, whereas the large English-speaking population in Montréal is viewed 
by many Québécois nationalist as reminiscent of the historic Anglophone socio-economic 
domination of Québec and the resulting cultural division of labour. Flemish nationalists point 
to the fact that only 28.3 percent of Brussels’ population of 1.02 million can speak Dutch, 
despite Brussels being an enclave within the region of Flanders, while 95.55 percent are able 
to communicate in French.
175
 Thus, Flemish nationalists sound the alarm over the requirement 
to provide French language facilities for Francophones living in the Flemish municipalities on 
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the periphery of Brussels. There is fear among Flemish nationalists that the growing numbers 
of French speakers in the Flemish municipalities around Brussels will slowly expand the 
Francophone influence deeper into Flemish territory, a phenomenon of known as verfransing 
(Frenchification), which Flemish nationalists also refer to as being like an expanding olievlek 
(oil-stain).
176
  
Similarly, the linguistic situation in Montréal is one of the flashpoints of the Québec 
sovereigntist movement. Historically, the unilingualism of downtown Montréal in the 1950s 
and 1960s was a catalyst for Québec society’s ‘Quiet Revolution’. Presently, the sovereignty 
movement points to the threat of a growing Anglicization of Montréal (especially in regards to 
Allophones and new immigrants) as an imposition of the Canadian federal government’s 
policy of bilingualism, a policy effectively viewed by sovereigntists as a means of attacking 
the French language in Québec.
177
 
The separatists in Flanders and the sovereigntists in Québec have emerged as the 
galvanizing force behind the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, 
despite the fact that Flanders and Québec presently enjoy a high degree of devolution of power 
within their respective federal states, including extensive control over education, language, 
and cultural affairs. Since the 1960s, both nationalist movements have worked towards 
establishing an alternative nation-state structure separate from the federal government, and this 
feat has resulted in a combination of popular support for territorial decentralization and the 
institutional capacity to translate that support into meaningful political pressure. In terms of 
the political strategy to obtain independence, both the largest Flemish separatist political party, 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, and the principal Québec sovereigntist political party, le Parti 
Québécois, currently call for a gradual increase in the devolution of power away from the 
respective federal governments in Belgium and Canada, until the democratic obtainment of 
independence for Flanders and Québec becomes an inevitability.
178
 
 The Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have profoundly influenced the 
social and political landscape of their respective societies. In fact, nationalism has become a 
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dominant characteristic of the socio-political culture in both Flanders and Québec. Both 
nationalist movements have been defined by an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and 
ethno-linguistic conception of their nations, which originated as an oppositional reaction to a 
linguistically based cultural division of labour. This has resulted in both contemporary 
nationalist movements having a similar nationalist profile (nationalist discourse, cultural-
linguistic agenda, and political strategy and objectives), despite the fact that the Flemish 
nationalist movement is rooted in more right-leaning Christian democratic principles, while 
the Québécois nationalist movement is ideologically secular and social-democratic in nature. 
As a means of explaining this phenomenon, we point to key shared memories and symbols 
that act as a causal mechanism in perpetuating the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and 
conception of the national identity in Flanders and Québec; however, before analysing these 
shared memories and symbols, the following chapter highlights the clear diverging 
characteristics that intuitively should act as differentiating influences on the Flemish and 
Québécois nationalist movements.   
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Chapter 4  
Structural and Socio-Demographic Differences 
 The similar nationalist profile of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements 
seems almost counter-intuitive when considering the vastly different influential elements that 
have been present in each nationalist movement’s historical development. The following 
sections will review these differences, including the diverging ideological principles of both 
national movements, as well as the contrasting socio-demographic, economic, and political 
realities of Flanders’ place within Belgium as compared to Québec’s position within Canada.  
  
4.1 Structural Differences between the Flemish and Québécois Nationalist Movements  
 Political actors and parties have become the primary focal point for both the 
contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. However, there are a number of 
differences between Flanders and Québec in terms of the political divisions and organization 
of the nationalist political parties. The contemporary nationalist movement in Québec has been 
politically centralized around the Parti Québecois and the issue of sovereignty since the 
1970s.
179
 And despite the recent emergence in Québec of a more left-leaning social democratic 
sovereigntist party, Québec Solidaire, the PQ presently maintains its predominant role as the 
political vehicle for the objectives of the Québec sovereigntist movement.
180
 Nevertheless, all 
provincial political parties in Québec have members proclaiming to be some degree of 
‘nationalist’, whether that label be as a ‘sovereigntists’, ‘federalist-nationalists’ (which are 
primarily members of the Parti Libéral du Québec), or ‘autonomists’ (used to describe some 
members of Coalition Avenir Québec). However, although both federalist-nationalist and 
autonomists (or soft-nationalists) seek constitutional recognition of Québec’s cultural 
distinction within Canada, they differ from sovereigntists in that they do not seek full 
independence for Québec. 
 In Flanders, the nationalist movement is politically much more fragmented than in 
Québec with double the number of viable Flemish nationalist political parties. This is due to 
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the fact that several Flemish political parties can be said to be sympathetic with the Flemish 
Movement; however, these Flemish political parties are divided by being either ‘separatist’ or 
‘confederalist’. The two political parties focused on Flemish nationalism, Vlaams Belang and 
N-VA, are separatist, with both parties seeking outright independence for Flanders, while the 
Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (Christian Democratic and Flemish, or CD&V), Libertair, 
Direct, Democratisch (Libertarian, Direct, Democratic, or LDD), and Open Vlaamse 
Liberalen en Democraten (Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats, or Open VLD) all prefer a 
confederal option for a more autonomous Flanders within Belgium.
181
  
 Despite the larger number of nationalist political parties in Flanders, Flemish political 
parties will very often come together to establish coalitions (or ‘cartels’ as they are called in 
Belgium) at both the federal and regional levels—a phenomenon that does not occur in 
Québec. Moreover, all of the Flemish political parties have a presence at both the regional and 
federal levels of government. In Québec, however, the nationalist movement is primarily 
concentrated at the provincial level of government, namely in the form of the Parti Québécois, 
while the Bloc Québécois (BQ), which functions separately from the PQ (although the two 
parties are associated), has the objective of representing the interests of Québec and the 
sovereigntist movement at the federal level of government within the Canadian Parliament. 
 But the most dramatic structural difference between the Flemish and Québécois 
nationalist movement is the presence of a clear ideological cleavage; in Flanders, the Flemish 
Movement is rooted in Catholic conservatism and economic liberalism, while in Québec the 
nationalist movement is secular and predominantly social-democratic.
182
 This ideological 
difference has resulted in the principal Flemish nationalist political parties—the far-right 
Vlaams Belang, the conservative N-VA, and the Christian-democratic CD&V—on the 
opposite side of the political spectrum from the Québécois nationalist movement’s main 
political parties, most notably the centre-left Parti Québécois. These ideological differences 
can be traced to a contrasting relationship with the Catholic Church and the development of 
opposing economic principles.  
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4.2 Influence of the Catholic Church and Far Right on the Flemish Nationalist Movement 
 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, while facing the simultaneous threat of 
liberalism, socialism, and a modernizing Jacobin state, the Catholic Church in Belgium 
decided to enter into mass politics after the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1894, in 
an attempt to galvanize the support of the newly enfranchised Dutch-speaking masses. The 
Church capitalized on class, religion, and language divisions in order to combat the anti-
clerical alliance of predominantly French-speaking liberals and socialists at the time, 
successfully tapping into Flemish discontentment.
183
  
  The shift towards mass politics forced the Catholic Church to take drastic measures in 
order to hold back a growing tide of anticlericalism; the church was motivated by the fear that 
a socialist movement might give the secularism proposed by liberals in Belgium the vital mass 
support it needed. Therefore, the Catholic clergy decided to take an active role in Belgian 
politics, and in due course Flemish nationalism was incorporated into the Catholic labour 
movement in order to win over the Flemish lower classes.
184
 This decision by the Belgian 
clergy during the late nineteenth century resulted in the Flemish nationalist project being 
securely linked to the Catholic Church. Furthermore, by championing the cause of a Catholic 
Flanders during a time of industrialization and the expansion of political suffrage, the church 
would come to greatly influence the Flemish nationalist movement’s conservative character. 
 Ultimately, the Catholic Church was, and to some extent remains, a major constitutive 
force in the Flemish Movement, having a powerful material and ideological influence within 
the education system and labour organization in Flanders.
185
 In fact, the Flemish labour 
movement is associated with the Christian democratic principles of the Flemish nationalist 
movement, and several Christian trade unions are united under the General Association of 
Christian Unions (Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond), in addition to the Christian Labour 
Union (Algemeen Christelijk Werkersverbond) and the Union of Christian Employers 
(Verbond van Christelijke Werkgevers en Kaders).
186
 Moreover, the Flemish Press is also 
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dominated by ideologically Christian Democratic publications, as five of the seven main daily 
newspapers in Flanders have editorials taking a Christian democratic political stance.
187
 The 
influence of the Catholic Church on the Flemish nationalist movement is profound, and partly 
explains the ideological divisions in Belgium between the predominantly socialist Wallonia 
and the predominantly Christian democratic Flanders, with the Flemish nationalist movement 
having internalized the Catholic/secular cleavage of Belgian politics.
188
  
 Due to the influence of this historic role of the Catholic Church in shaping the Flemish 
Movement, Flemish nationalism is considerably more socially conservative than the 
nationalism expressed by the Québec sovereignty movement. This is reflected by the presence 
of the influential far-right within the Flemish nationalist movement. The political embodiment 
of this far-right element of Flemish nationalism began with the Vlaams Blok in 1978, which 
rebranded itself the Vlaams Belang in 2004. The Vlaams Belang has softened the xenophobic 
rhetoric and the calls for economic ‘solidarity’ in the form of an anti-trade union and 
conservative collectivist economic platform, which were central to the Vlaams Blok. 
Nevertheless, the Vlaams Belang has carried forward most of the far-right political ideals of 
Flemish nationalism that were embraced by its predecessor.
189
 The far-right has managed to 
pull the political centre of the Flemish nationalist movement to the right, as the conservative 
and centre-right Flemish nationalist political parties have felt compelled to incorporate aspects 
of the far-right agenda; an agenda that includes strong anti-immigration, anti-Francophone, 
and ‘anti-Belgian’ positions.190  
 
4.3 The Secularism of the Québécois Nationalist Movement 
 From the mid-nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, the Catholic Church 
defined the character of French-Canadian nationalism and was the dominant social and 
political force in Québec society. One of the main reasons for this phenomenon was the fact 
that the church had total control over the education system in Québec, as well as having a 
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direct influence over the government.
191
 In fact, during the era of the Union Nationale 
government of Maurice Duplessis, from 1944 to 1960, the Catholic Church was relied upon to 
shoulder the financial burden of
 
education, hospital care, and social assistance; and thus, 
permitting the Duplessis government in Québec to ‘opt out’ of programs requiring financing 
from the Canadian federal government, which was done in the name of autonomy for the only 
province having a French-Canadian and Catholic majority.
192
 But as a result of increased 
wealth, social mobility, urbanization, and a secularization of labour, the church in post-war 
Québec was unable to maintain its institutional status in terms of fulfilling the social 
dependencies of the French-Canadian society.
193
  
 These societal changes resulted in the emergence of a neo-nationalist political class 
beginning in the 1950s, which saw the influence of the Catholic Church as an obstacle to 
social and economic progress, and to the modernization of Québec. Instead, neo-nationalists 
turned their attention to Québec’s provincial political institutions, or the ‘state’, as the motor 
that would propel Québec forward. As a result, the ecclesiastical influence in Québec was put 
into question by unions, cultural organizations, colleges, universities, etc., and eventually the 
Catholic Church was replaced by the Québec state structure as the cohesive social force in 
Québec society. The Québec governmental institutions gradually assumed control over matters 
concerning education, culture, social assistance, and the redistribution of wealth.
194
 The 
emergence of a new political class would eventually break the church’s hold over Québec 
society during the ‘Quiet Revolution’ of the 1960s, and in the process establish Québec 
nationalism as a secular movement.
195
  
 The secular nature of the contemporary nationalist movement in Québec is in stark 
contrast to the influential role of the Catholic Church in the development of the contemporary 
Flemish nationalist movement. This has resulted in the politics of Flemish nationalism being 
far more conservative and ‘rightist’ than the left-leaning ideology of the present Québec 
sovereignty movement. This ideological difference is compounded by opposing economic 
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policies, with the Flemish Movement subscribing to economic liberalism, while the Québécois 
nationalist movement has developed a primarily ‘statist’ economic approach. Nevertheless, 
both types of economic policies originate from an effort to overcome the cultural division of 
labour that had historically been present in Flanders and Québec.
196
  
 
4.4 The Flemish Movement’s Economic Liberalism 
 In the mid-1950s, as the Flemish economy began to catch up to that of Wallonia, the 
Flemish nationalist movement pushed for a reversal of the disadvantaged socio-economic 
situation of Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium. The economic development of Flanders 
would be due in large part to an expansion of Flemish higher education and a movement to 
have Flemish workers stay in Flanders with the slogan, “Werk in eigen streek” (Work in your 
region), rather than providing labour for Walloon industry.
197
 
In the midst of an influx of foreign investment into Flanders, due primarily to the 1957 
Treaty of Rome, which created a free-trade zone between Germany, France, Italy, and the 
Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg), and to the 1959 Belgian 
legislation favouring foreign investment,
198
 the Flemish Movement became focused on the 
socio-economic situation in Flanders. In fact, Flanders would benefit from twice as much 
foreign investment as did Wallonia during this time, largely due to the relatively low level of 
salaries and maritime accessibility.
199
 
 The economic expansion in Flanders continued during the 1960s and 1970s, 
encouraged by a liberal economic approach stemming from the Flemish Movement, and 
subsequently shaping the economic policies of the Flemish regional government. More 
specifically, a Fordist economic model was adopted in Flanders, and there was a focus on the 
development of small and medium enterprises. This economic liberalism would be in contrast 
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to the socialist economic policies that were present in Wallonia at the time. Over the course of 
the 1980s and 1990s, the economic growth of Flanders continued, while the economy of 
Wallonia slowed down; and by the 2000s, the Flemish economy would grow to account for 60 
percent of Belgium’s GDP.200  
  
4.5 Social Democratic and Statist Nature of the Québécois Nationalist Movement 
 In contrast to the Flemish liberal approach, nationalists in Québec adopted an 
economic model aimed at creating a Keynesian ‘welfare state’. 201  During the ‘Quiet 
Revolution’ of the 1960s in Québec, the Québécois nationalist movement ushered in a ‘statist’ 
economic philosophy, which was based on the idea that Québec as a political entity, or in 
other words the Québec ‘state’, should be used to the socio-economic benefit of Québec 
society, and especially in terms of improving the socio-economic situation of Franchophones. 
This feat was to be achieved by using the capacities of Québec’s provincial government and 
institutions as a vehicle to redistribute wealth, to create a regime of social insurance, and to 
reorganize Québec’s education system.202 
 The economic engine behind Québec’s statist economic model emerged in 1963, when 
the governing Liberal party of the time ‘nationalized’ Hydro-Québec, the provincial electricity 
provider. Hydro-Québec would serve as the symbol of the capacity of Québécois to control 
large scale technological and publicly financed projects.
203
 The financial capital for Québec’s 
public projects would come from la Caisse de depot et placement du Québec, which was the 
public financial institution created in 1965 to manage Québec’s pension plan, and as a means 
of investment of the funds coming into the public coffers from several public agencies, such as 
la Société d’assurance automobile (Québec’s public auto-insurance provider).204  
  The social democratic economic nature of the Québécois nationalist movement has 
been marked by the labour movement and the strong and influential socialist-nationalist 
unions in Québec, most notably the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), which 
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regrouped several of Québec’s labour unions. Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, the 
CSN subscribed to a Marxist ideology of class struggle, and viewed workers as the integral 
part of the Québécois nation.
205
   
 Politically, however, the Parti Québécois was influenced during the 1980s and 1990s 
by the rise of economic neo-conservatism and the push for a North American free-trade zone. 
The ‘Québec Model’ of statist economic development was put into question. Fiscal constraint 
and privatization were embraced as means of reducing Québec’s provincial debt; this notably 
was the case over the course of Lucien Bouchard’s tenure as premier from 1995 until 2001, 
during which time the Québec government subscribed to an economic strategy of ‘deficit 
zero’, a measure aimed at addressing Québec’s substantial public debt.206 Nevertheless, the 
nationalist movement in Québec is generally still rooted in left-leaning economic principles, 
such as favouring government intervention into the economy and the development of the 
welfare state. The secular-statist nature of the Québécois nationalist movement, which 
developed during the ‘Quiet Revolution’ of the 1960s, remains a pillar of the contemporary 
sovereignty movement in Québec, and in contrast to the liberal economic principles of the 
Flemish nationalist movement. 
 
4.6 Socio-Demographic and Political Differences between Flanders and Québec 
 Both the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements define the territorial integrity 
of their nations as encompassing sub-state units (the region of Flanders and the province of 
Québec), both of which are part of federal states—Belgium and Canada respectively. 
However, there are significant socio-demographic and political differences between Belgium 
and Canada, as well as between Flanders and Québec. While it is true that Belgium and 
Canada are both constitutional monarchies, are both governed by parliamentary democracies, 
and are both multilingual, decentralized federations, their specific composition differs a great 
deal.  
 Belgium is politically divided into five sub-national entities. The main political 
division is between the federal parliament located in Brussels and three regions: Flanders, 
Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region. The Belgian federal government is responsible for 
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all affairs considered to be ‘common heritage’; this includes justice, defence, federal police, 
social security, public debt and other aspects of public finances, nuclear energy, and state-
owned companies such as the Post Office and Belgian Railways. It is also responsible for the 
obligations of Belgium and its federalized institutions within the European Union and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and controls substantial parts of public health 
and foreign affairs. 
 The regions of Flanders and Wallonia are divided into five provinces (the Brussels-
Capital Region does not have provinces), and all three regions are also comprised of 
municipalities. Regions supervise the provinces and municipalities, and have authority in their 
territory over activity relating to the economy, employment, agriculture, water policy, housing, 
public works, energy, transport, the environment, town and country planning, nature 
conservation, credit, and foreign trade.  
 Belgium also has three official languages—Dutch, French, and German—and all 
matters concerning language are governed by the administration of communities, including 
culture, education, health policy, and assistance to individuals (protection of youth, social 
welfare, aid to families, immigrant assistance services, etc.). Each community exercises its 
competence only within linguistically determined geographical boundaries. The linguistic 
boundary of the German Community is located within the provinces of Liège and 
Luxembourg, both of which are located in the region of Wallonia, with the rest of Wallonia 
being administered by the French Community. The Dutch Community administers linguistic 
matters in Flanders and shares the administration of the Brussels-Capital Region (which is 
officially bilingual) with the French Community.  
 On the other hand, Canada’s federal system of government comprises of two distinct 
jurisdictions of political authority: the federal government and ten provincial governments. 
Canada also has three Northern territorial governments; however, these are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the federal government. The division of powers between the federal and 
provincial governments is outlined in Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act of 
1867, Canada’s original constitution.  
 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act of 1982 and the 
Official Languages act of 1988 entrench French and English as the official languages of 
Canada. Sections 16 to 19 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantee the 
 
 
66 
 
equal status of both languages in Parliament, in all federal government institutions, and in 
federal courts, while Section 20 guarantees the right of the Canadian public be able to 
communicate in English and French with any central federal government office or with 
regional offices where there is “a significant demand for communication with and services 
from that office.”207 However, ‘a significant demand’ was not defined in the Charter of Rights, 
an issue that was remedied by the Official Languages Act of 1988. Apart from the federal 
level of government, English-French bilingualism has been made constitutionally applicable to 
only one of Canada’s ten provinces, New Brunswick. Québec’s official language is French, 
and the other eight provinces have English as their official language (although Manitoba and 
Ontario have passed legislation to provide provincial government services in both English and 
French).   
 Although Belgium and Canada are both constitutional monarchies, with the monarch in 
each country acting as a symbolic head of state and having no real political power, the 
sovereignty movement in Québec views the Monarchy (which Canada shares with the United 
Kingdom) as a recurring presence and reminder of Anglo-Canadian cultural oppression and 
‘colonization’. In contrast, the contemporary Flemish Movement has traditionally supported 
Belgium’s Monarch; for example, there was far more support from Dutch-speaking Flemings 
and within the Flemish Movement for reinstating Belgium’s Monarch after World War Two, 
than there was within the French-speaking Walloon community. Today, both Flemings and 
Walloons accept Belgium’s King Albert II as a mediator in resolving Belgium’s recent 
political crises.  
 There is also a contrast in the political and economic influence of Flanders and Québec 
within their respective federal systems, due primarily to the demographic differences between 
the two sub-states. The predominately Dutch-speaking population of the region of Flanders is 
6.05 million, which is 56 percent of Belgium’s total population of 11 million. In terms of the 
linguistic communities in Belgium, 59 percent are Dutch speakers and only 38 percent have 
French as their first language.
208
 Thus, Dutch-speaking Flemings have a clear demographic 
advantage in Belgium.  
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 Québec, however, is only one of ten Canadian provinces, and it has a population of 
around 8 million (80 percent of which are Francophones), which is around 23 percent of 
Canada’s total population of 34.5 million; and only 22.1 percent of that total population are 
Francophones, with 91.2 percent of them being located in Québec.
209
 As a result of the 
minority situation of Québec and Francophones within Canada, sovereigntists claim that 
Québec’s independence is the only way to guarantee the Québécois nation’s political control 
over its culture and to ensure that the French language is protected in Québec.  
 Along with the Flemish demographic majority, the region of Flanders has far and away 
the most robust economy in Belgium, accounting for 60 percent of Belgium’s total gross 
domestic product, and has an unemployment rate that is considerably lower than in the 
Wallonia or the Brussels-Capital regions.
210
 Moreover, data from 2007 shows that the gross 
geographical product (GGP) per capita in Flanders was almost 32,000 euros, whereas the GGP 
for Wallonia was 23,000 euros.
211
 As a result of the Flemish economy’s superior strength, the 
region of Flanders provides a much larger sum of money to the federal government in the form 
of direct and indirect transfers. The National Solidarity Intervention program is the mechanism 
designed to reduce fiscal disparities between the federated entities in Belgium through direct 
transfers. Under the program, those regions in which the average per capita yield of personal 
income tax falls below the national average are entitled to an unconditional transfer from the 
federal government. Therefore, the amount paid to each region reflects the gap in the yield of 
personal income tax in the region in relation to the national average, weighted by an indexing 
factor and a factor pertaining to the amounts received by beneficiaries when the system was 
introduced.
212
 Due to their inferior fiscal capacity, the Brussels and Wallonia regions are 
recipients of the National Solidarity transfers at the expense of the region of Flanders, which 
does not receive funding under this program as its fiscal capacity lies above the national 
average. Furthermore, due to the larger intake of tax revenue in Flanders, Flemings make 
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indirect transfers by way of higher contributions into social security and towards the federal 
budget.
213
  
 Québec, on the other hand, is largely a benefactor of the federal transfer system in 
Canada. The Canadian Equalization Program is based on a formula that calculates the 
difference between the per capita revenue yield that a particular province would obtain using 
average tax rates, and the national average per capita revenue yield at average tax rates. The 
objective of the program is to ensure that all provinces have access to per capita revenues 
equal to the potential average of all ten provinces. In 2011-2012, Québec will receive $7.815-
billion in equalization payments, which is the largest sum among the six so-called ‘have-not’ 
provinces that benefit from the equalization program.
214
  
 Despite the fact that Québec is the largest recipient of federal transfers in Canada, and 
Flanders, conversely, is the provider of inter-regional transfers in Belgium, Québec 
nationalists, including sovereigntists, mirror Flemish nationalists in advocating for an end to 
federal transfers. However, in Flanders it is based on a resentment of having to prop up 
Wallonia’s ‘failed economy’, whereas in Québec there is a desire to terminate the culture of 
Québec’s dependence and obligation to the Canadian federal government under the 
Equalization Program.
215
 
 Due to Flanders’ demographic weight in Belgium, the Flemish nationalist political 
parties have considerably more sway over Belgium’s federal Parliament than does Québec’s 
federal sovereigntist party, the Bloc Québécois, in Canada’s federal Parliament. The Chamber 
of Representatives in Belgium has 150 elected members from 11 electoral districts. The 
districts are divided along linguistic lines, and there are five Flemish districts making-up 79 
seats. In the 2010 federal election, this formula resulted in the Flemish nationalist-separatist 
party NV-A winning the most seats in the Chamber of Representatives at 27, one more than 
the Walloon Parti Socialiste, which won 26; CD&V, a Flemish Christian-democratic party 
sympathetic to the Flemish Movement, won the third-most seats with 17.
216
 Flanders also has 
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the most political sway in the Belgian Senate, which consists of 71 members from four 
categories of appointment: directly elected senators, community senators, co-opted senators, 
and senators by right. There are 25 Flemish and 15 Francophone senators directly elected from 
Belgium’s three regional constituencies. Of the Community senators, 10 are elected by 
the Flemish Parliament, 10 by the Parliament of the French Community, and one by 
the Parliament of the German-speaking Community.  
 In the Canadian federal Parliament, the province of Québec has 75 seats out of the 308 
seats in the House of Commons, which are distributed among Canada’s 10 provinces and 
territories according to population. This means that, although Québec has considerable 
representation, it is outnumbered by the other Canadian provinces and territories, which are 
predominantly Anglophone. Moreover, there are multiple federal political parties that run 
candidates in Québec, and only one of which, the Bloc Québécois, represents the sovereigntist 
movement. After the 2011 Canadian federal election, the Bloc Québécois was reduced to four 
elected Members of Parliament, which is below the required number of twelve for a party to 
be officially recognized in the Canadian House of Commons.
217
  
  Senators in Canada are not elected but rather appointed to the Senate by the Governor 
General based on the instruction from Canada’s Prime Minister. The 105 seats in the Senate 
are divided equally amongst four geographic regions: 24 for Ontario, 24 for Québec, 24 for 
the Maritime Provinces (10 for Nova Scotia, 10 for New Brunswick, and 4 for Prince Edward 
Island), 24 for the Western provinces (6 each for Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, 
and Alberta), Newfoundland-and-Labrador is represented by six senators, and there is one 
senator for each of Canada's three Northern territories (the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, 
and Nunavut). Therefore, although the province of Québec has significant representation and 
political weight within Canada’s federal government, it does not have the same political sway 
that the region of Flanders has in Belgium’s federal government. Consequently, the Québec 
sovereigntist movement has pointed to Québec’s minority status within Canada’s federal 
system, which has a majority of representation from ‘English-Canada’, as an underlying 
reason for Québec’s need to obtain statehood and full self-government.  
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 However, despite the Flemish demographic superiority and subsequent political weight 
and majority position in Belgium’s federal government, there is a continued push by Flemish 
nationalist political parties for either increased decentralization or the outright independence 
of Flanders. The discourse of the Flemish nationalist movement mirrors that of the Québec 
sovereigntists, in that it is focused on the perceived threat and imposition of the Francophones 
in Flemish territory (Québec sovereigntists are similarly focused on threat and imposition 
coming from Anglophone Canadians), and specifically in the periphery of Brussels. Moreover, 
just as is the case for sovereigntists in Québec, Flamingants continue to frame their political 
discourse regarding Flemish political and social matters in the context of victimization and 
injustice, and relying on the evocation of the ‘shared memories’ of the past.218     
 In fact, the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements focus very much on the 
linguistic situation in Brussels (especially in the periphery) and in Montréal respectively, 
which are viewed by Flamingants and Québec sovereigntists as the primary linguistic 
battlegrounds for their respective nationalist struggles. This is regardless of the fact that 
Brussels is an officially bilingual region unto itself in Belgium, with only seven percent 
counted as using Dutch at home, with 66.5 percent using French (with nine percent counted as 
being bilingual);
219
 whereas the official language of Montréal, the largest city in the province 
of Québec, is French, with metropolitan Montréal having 66.5 percent Francophones, 13.2 
percent Anglophones, and 22 percent Allophones (having neither English or French as a first 
language). Furthermore, the vast majority of people in Montréal (86 percent) have a functional 
knowledge of French. In Brussels, however, despite being officially bilingual, more than 95 
percent of people are able to speak French, but more people can speak English (34.4 percent) 
than can speak Dutch (28.23 percent).
220
 The Flemish nationalist movement, including 
Flemish separatists, have resigned themselves to the fact that Brussels is a Francophone city 
within Flemish territory, and the focus of Flamingants has turned to an end to the provision of 
French linguistic facilities in the Flemish municipalities on the periphery of Belgium, most 
notably in Halle-Vilvoorde. There is the sentiment among Flemish nationalists that 
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Francophones choosing to live in Flemish territory should respect Flemish institutions, 
legislation, and the official language of Flanders—Dutch.  
    Conversely, in Montréal, despite the presence of a large Anglophone population, 
Francophones are still the majority. Linguistic legislation is in place in the form of Bill 101, 
which is largely aimed at ensuring Montréal remains a predominantly Francophone city, a 
battle Dutch-speaking Flemings lost long ago. Montréal remains an integral part of the 
province of Québec, and not a separate federal entity like Brussels is in Belgium. In fact, the 
Francophones of Brussels prefer to see themselves as having a separate identity apart from 
Walloons and Flemings alike. Nevertheless, Flemish and Québécois nationalists view Brussels 
and Montréal respectively as a symbolic linkage to the historic struggle against the injustices 
and the imposition of a ‘cultural division of labour’ defined along linguistic lines.      
In summary, despite the clear structural and socio-demographic differences between 
the region of Flanders in Belgium and the province of Québec in Canada, as well as the 
structural and ideological differences between the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements, contemporary flamigants and sovereigntists have maintained very similar 
nationalist profiles. In other words, in spite of several potential contrasting influences on the 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, both flamigants and sovereigntists have 
continued to share a nationalist discourse contextualized by the objective of cultural-linguistic 
preservation, as well as the attainment of self-determination and the political independence of 
the ‘nation’.  
It is the premise of this dissertation that the explanation for this phenomenon can be 
found at the origin of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, in 
terms of their paralleling genesis as an oppositional reaction to the imposition of a cultural 
division of labour. The product of this oppositional reaction was an ethno-linguistic 
nationalism of protest in Flanders and Québec, along with the development of a national 
identity that was defined by the tenets of this ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest. However, 
this phenomenon has not been maintained out of its own fruition. Nationalists in both Flanders 
and Québec have relied on shared memories and symbols as means of reinforcing and 
perpetuating the tenets of the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest and collective conception 
of the national identity. 
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Part III 
Influence of ‘Shared Memories’ and Symbols 
 The Flemish and Québécois ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, as well as both 
nationalist movements’ conception of the national identity, has been predicated on the 
characteristics of injustice and struggle, which stem from the origin of both nationalist 
movements as vehicles of opposition against the imposition of a linguistically based cultural 
division of labour and as a means of overcoming the resulting limitations on the socio-
economic mobility of Dutch-speaking Flemings and French-Speaking Québécois. However, as 
the situation of the Flemish and Québécois societies has evolved and diverged, both nationalist 
movements have continued to be rooted in the same tenets that were established at their 
origins. These tenets have been reinforced and perpetuated by a continual link to the past in 
the form of shared memories and symbols, which are evoked and interpreted within a present 
context. This has subsequently resulted in the similar profiles of the Flemish and Québécois 
nationalist movements, expressing a discourse that continues to reflect a sense of injustice and 
struggle. 
 The following chapter will explain how shared memories and symbols have been vital 
for nationalists in conceptualizing the Flemish and Québécois national identities within the 
context of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which is the very foundation of the 
contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements. This will be done by analyzing 
specific events within the historical narrative of both groups that have provided the key shared 
memories and symbolic links for nationalists in Flanders and Québec to define their respective 
national identities and to perpetuate the sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest within 
both communities. Ultimately, it is the similarity in the nature of the shared memories of 
injustices, indignity, and struggle perpetuated by Flemish and Québécois nationalists that 
accounts for the continued presence of the similar nationalist profiles of both nationalist 
movements. 
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Chapter 5 
Identity Formation 
In essence, nations can only exist in the context of nationalism; cultural communities 
and their members are defined as ‘nations’ and ‘nationals’ by the discourse of nationalism.221 
The discourse of both Flemish and Québécois nationalists was established in the context of a 
movement of protest against imposed limitations on their socio-economic mobility, which had 
been historically caused by a cultural division of labour defined along linguistic lines. Thus, 
the nationalist rhetoric of the contemporary nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec has 
been contextualized in an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest.   
Influenced by the established principles of this ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, 
the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements define their respective national identities on 
the notion of a frontier separating the ‘nation’ from ‘others’. This phenomenon is defined by 
the ‘reactive ethnicity perspective’, which explains that ethnic ties (most notably language in 
the case of the Flemish and the Québécois) among economically disadvantaged individuals 
plays an independent role in facilitating conditions for the group formation that is essential to 
political mobilization.
222
 In Flanders and in Québec, the presence of a cultural division of 
labour helped shape the solidarity of ethnic identities in the context of a collective awareness 
of struggle and oppression. The cultivation and promotion of this solidarity of ethnic identity 
was largely influenced by nationalists evoking shared memories and symbols that were 
reflective of the tenets of the ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest that developed in Flanders 
and in Québec. These shared memories and symbols establish a link between the collective 
memory of the present and those historic events exemplifying a sense of struggle, 
discrimination, and victimization of the ethno-linguistic nation.   
 
5.1 Process of Identity Formation  
 Nationalists are instrumental in shaping the concept of the national identity, and this is 
done as a means of “mobilizing, unifying, and legitimizing the objectives of sub-elites in their 
quest for power; and they achieve this feat by utilizing nationalism and the specious historicist 
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idea of an organic nation.”223 A group’s ‘identity formation’ is achieved through an elaborate 
process of nationalist ‘myth making’, which is based on the evocation and reinterpretation of 
the shared memories of historical events, and subsequently the assigning of symbolical value 
to those shared memories.
224
 The nation building campaign of Flemish and Québécois 
nationalists utilized an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest as a means of galvanizing the 
Dutch-speaking and French-speaking communities in Flanders and Québec respectively, with 
the goal of overcoming the obstacles to social mobility imposed by the presence of a 
linguistically discriminatory cultural division of labour. Nationalists in Flanders and in Québec 
relied on the metonymic equation of language with culture, thus making the former the 
decisive element in defining Flemish and Québécois national identity.  
 In Flanders and in Québec, national identity is associated with the use of a common 
language, while also being rooted in the shared memories and symbolism of the Flemish and 
Québécois ‘ethnic’ community. In both communities, the nationalist conceptualization of the 
nation has been contextualized within the development of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of 
protest, relying on shared memories as a means of reinforcing the ethno-linguistic demarcation 
of the nation.   
  
5.2 Vlaams (Flemish) Identity Formation 
 The Flemish nationalist movement was essentially born out of a struggle in Belgium 
between the established Francophone bourgeoisie and a rising Dutch-speaking Flemish 
bourgeoisie, with the latter desiring to replace the former. Flemish nationalists were largely 
from an ascending Flemish middle class that aspired to take the reins as the ruling class in 
Flanders, and consequently decided to seize cultural power.
225
 The Flemish Movement did not 
begin as an ‘ethnic’ nationalist movement because initially there was no sense of Flemish 
ethnic identity. It is important to note that prior to the creation of the Belgian state in 1830, 
Flanders had never previously existed politically, administratively, economically, or even 
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culturally as it does in its present form.
226
 However, the Flemish community has gone through 
a process of ‘ethnic revival’, in which language has acted as the core symbol of, and driving 
force behind, the social, economic, and political ‘emancipation’ of Dutch-speaking Flemings 
in Belgium.
227
  
 It was the creation of a predominantly Francophone Belgian state structure in the mid-
nineteenth century that gave rise to the initial stage of development of the Flemish nationalist 
movement. Flemish nationalist activism began with an academic and literary inquiry into the 
Flemish identity, most notably in the form of Flemish author Hendrik Conscience’s 1838 
novel, “The Lion of Flanders,” coupled with a struggle for linguistic equality in Flanders and 
at the national level.
228
 However, this initial phase of the Flemish Movement was done in the 
context of a bi-national Flemish identity, and did not seek to establish a distinction between a 
Flemish and Belgian identity, but rather include a Flemish dimension to that latter.
229
   
 The gradual construction of a distinct Flemish identity was largely the result of the 
refusal by French-speaking elites in Belgium to remove the obstacles facing the socio-
economic mobility of Flemings by making the Belgian state bilingual. This opposition led the 
Flemish nationalist elites to proceed with political initiatives and a nationalist agitation that 
articulated Flanders and Flemings as a distinct entity within Belgium.
230
 The change in the 
conception of the Flemish identity can be identified with Miroslav Hroch’s model of the 
developmental process of a national movement as the transition from ‘Phase A’ to ‘Phase B’ 
of development; in other words, the initial nationalist activity devoted to scholarly inquiry 
into, and subsequent propagation of, an awareness of the identifiable attributes of the non-
dominant ethnic group (culture, language, history, etc.), gradually transitioning to a nationalist 
agitation that was aimed at spreading the idea of the distinct national identity in the context of 
creating a modern nation.     
 The First World War would act as a catalyst for the Flemish Movement to embrace and 
spread the idea of a distinct Flemish national identity. The discrimination and injustices 
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suffered by Flemish-speaking soldiers in what was essentially a French-speaking Belgian 
Army, led to Flemish nationalists rallying behind the banner of the Frontpartij (Front Party). 
The Frontpartij acted as the vehicle for nationalist agitation in spreading the idea of an ethno-
linguistic Flemish national identity, outside a sense of Belgian identity and in contrast to a 
Francophone Walloon identity.  
 By the 1930s, the ethno-linguistic identity of a Flemish nation resided as an indubitable 
fact within the collective conscious of the Dutch-speaking community in Flanders.
231
 The 
language laws of the 1930s, most importantly the 1932 law on the use of language in 
administrative matters, established the principle of territorial unilingualism, which became 
irrevocably linked to the ideal of the Flemish nation.
232
 Flemish nationalists have relied on 
linguistic nationalism to render to the Flemish people an identity, which the process of 
Frenchification had historically denied Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium.
233
 Through the 
eyes of Flemish nationalists, the combat of Flanders was a cultural-linguistic struggle, as many 
nationalists considered that it is the language that makes the people. The Dutch language itself 
has been viewed as the “the flower of the Flemish civilization,” the vehicle to transmit the 
Flemish culture.
234
  
 The historical heritage of the linguistically based cultural division of labour still greatly 
influences the attitudes of contemporary Flemish nationalists.
235
 Nationalists view history as a 
source of continuity, and this continuity is then used to construct images of natural evolution 
or destiny. History and tradition are also associated with notions of naturalness and 
artificialness. For Flamingants, the more natural habitat of the Flemish people is within the 
Dutch cultural sphere because the Flemings share their main primordial feature—their 
language—with the Dutch. Belgium, therefore, is an ‘unnatural’ and artificial habitat for the 
Flemish people according to Flamingants, because it forces two peoples with totally different 
identities together into one state structure.
236
 Essentially, the Flemish identity has been 
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founded on a sentiment of injustice and cultural struggle, or more specifically linguistic 
struggle. It is the evocation of shared memories and the symbolism of these sentiments of 
injustice and linguistic combat that have defined the identity of the Flemish nation and the 
Flemish nationalist movement itself.     
 
5.3 Québécois Identity Formation 
 The entrenchment of a ‘Québécois’ national identity within the collective conscious of 
Francophones in Québec began during the Revolution Tranquille of the 1960s, and stems from 
a territorialization, secularization, and modernization of Québec. However, in contrast to the 
process of Flemish identity formation, the conceptualization of the Québécois national identity 
was a process of ‘identity transition’ for Québec’s Francophones, moving away from the 
perception of being part of a larger ‘French-Canadian’ nation, and instead developing the 
perception of a territorially linked ‘Québécois’ nation. This identity transition was undertaken 
by neo-nationalists during the 1960s and 1970s, as a means of overcoming the socio-economic 
disadvantages of Francophones in Québec.
237
 
 Initially, the French-Canadian ideal of ethnic nationalism was based on traditional 
Catholic and rural values, and seen as a means of cultural, linguistic, and religious survival 
under British (and later English-Canadian) domination. However, beginning in the 1950s, 
nationalist academics in Québec, who made up the so-called ‘Montréal School’, sought to 
establish a brand of nationalism better suited to a Québec society that had become more urban, 
industrial, and modern.
238
 Then in the 1960s, nationalists in Québec looked to take control of 
their socio-economic situation; no longer wanting to see themselves as a disadvantaged 
minority in Canada, they instead began to view themselves as the majority within Québec. As 
a means of achieving an amelioration of their socio-economic condition, nationalists in 
Québec subscribed to a new secular, modernized, and territorially defined conception of a 
Québécois nation.
239
 
 The transition from a ‘French-Canadian’ nationalism to a ‘Québécois’ nationalism can 
be viewed in the context of Miroslav Hroch’s model as the transition from ‘Phase A’ to ‘Phase 
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B’ of development for the Québécois nationalist movement. This is to say that nationalists in 
Québec shifted away from a simple concentration on the scholarly inquiry and propagation of 
their historic, cultural-linguistic, and religious attributes as the non-dominant ethnic group in 
Canada, and transitioned to a mode of nationalist agitation aimed at spreading the idea of a 
Québécois national identity, which was crucial for the nation-building project of contemporary 
Québécois nationalists.  
 The principal objective of Québécois nationalists during the Quiet Revolution of the 
1960s was to reverse the effects of what had been a cultural division of labour for 
Francophones in Québec, and ultimately become ‘Maîtres chez nous’ (Masters of our 
house).
240
 As a means of achieving this feat, Québécois nationalists set out to establish a 
‘nation state’ structure, which would permit Québec’s Francophones to have control over 
culture, education, and social and economic affairs.
241
 Thus, Québécois nationalists set out to 
spread the idea of a ‘Québécois’ national identity that was inseparably linked to the Québec 
‘state’ identity; as Hroch explains, this is often the case for nationalist movements as they 
enter ‘Phase B’ of development.242   
 Politically, however, Québécois nationalists have attempted to construct a ‘civic’ sense 
of Québécois nationalism, based squarely on a ‘territorialisation’ of Québec, and on a society 
in which French is the common language of public life. As the Parti Québécois rose to power 
in 1976, ushering in the sovereigntist party as the galvanizing political force behind the 
Québécois nationalist movement, then party leader René Lévesque began to distance the PQ 
from an ethnic interpretation of Québec culture, a fact made evident by the ‘white paper’ 
policy document of 1978, entitled La politique québécoise du dévloppement culturel (Québec 
Policy of Cultural Development). The document was used as a means promoting the concept 
of a ‘culture de convergence’ (culture of convergence), a policy that did not explicitly 
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recognize a central place for the ‘French-Canadian’ ethnicity as had been the case in the 
past.
243
 
 However, outside of the political rhetoric, many nationalists limit the term ‘Québécois’ 
to Francophones in Québec who can trace their origins to the anciens Canadiens français 
(original French-Canadians). Moreover, for many nationalists there exists the continued sense 
of a Québécois ethnicity associated with the ideal of Québécois de souche (old stock 
Québécois) or Québécois pure laine (true Québécois). Despite the intentions of political 
leaders, the Québécois national identity remains largely characterized within Québécois 
society by a clear distinction between members of the ‘Québécois’ nation on one hand 
(French-Canadian Francophones in Québec), and those of the ‘other’ cultural communities on 
the other.
244
 Regardless of the efforts by nationalist ‘elites’ in Québec to develop and define 
the Québécois national identity based on a ‘civic’ nationalism, the general conception among 
the community of individuals sharing an arbitrarily defined Canadiens français heritage in 
Québec continue to conceive their membership to the Québécois nation in ethnic terms.
245
     
 Even with the presence of a continuing debate within the Québécois nationalist 
movement over a ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ conception of what defines the Québécois nation, there is 
little argument among Québécois nationalists that there exists a community of Francophone 
Québécois defined by a common culture and historical ancestry (that of the anciens Canadien 
français). Therefore, these nationalists subscribing to a ‘civic’ conception of the Québécois 
nation argue that this group can be defined as encompassing a ‘cultural community’ within a 
greater cosmopolitan and pluralistic Québécois identity, rather than simply being thought of as 
having an ‘ethnic’ national identity.246 However, as Anthony D. Smith points out, the very 
attributes of an ethnic community are “named human populations with shared ancestry, myths, 
histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of 
solidarity.”247 Therefore, regardless of the debate over whether the criteria for membership of 
the Québécois identity is ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’, Québécois nationalism does consist of a 
conception of a Québécois ethnie based on the shared memories and symbols of the specific 
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Québécois ethno-linguistic group. But as John Hutchinson explains, these shifting cycles of 
cultural (or ethnic) and political nationalisms do occur within a national movement, one taking 
over when the other is temporarily exhausted, and one filling out what the other has failed to 
achieve or has neglected.
248
 These paralleling ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ conceptions of the 
Québécois national identity within the Québécois nationalist movement are far less present in 
the Flemish nationalist movement, which more openly embraces the ethnic principles of 
Flemish nationalism. Arguably, this is due to the influence and viability of the far-right 
political elements of the Flemish nationalist movement, which are almost non-existent in 
Québec. Nevertheless, contemporary nationalists in Québec have relied on language and 
territory as a means of circumventing the exclusivity of ethnie within the nationalist 
movement.
249
  
 In Québec, nationalism has replaced religion as the point of solidarity for 
Francophones, and it has been specifically language that has taken precedence over religion as 
the principal defining factor of the Québécois identity. By the early 1970s, the French 
language had clearly replaced the Catholic religion as the primary symbol of Québec society, 
and the Québec ‘state’ (as the modernized governmental apparatus became known) was 
viewed broadly as being primarily responsible for ensuring the predominance of French in 
Québec.
250
 No longer did the French speakers of Québec want to be considered as a minority 
in their ancestral home. Moreover, language has been the foundation for nationalist demands 
for recognition of a ‘distinct status’ for the province of Québec and the Québécois nation 
within Canada. Ultimately, the process of identity formation embarked upon by contemporary 
nationalists in Québec has universalized the term Québécois to represent a symbol of self-
affirmation, self-determination, and national-liberation within the collective conscious of those 
Francophones in Québec having anciens Canadiens français (original French-Canadian) 
origins. 
251
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 Québécois nationalists have established an ethno-linguistic sense of national identity, 
which is territorially linked to Québec, and they have had the capacity to politically emphasize 
the linguistic element of this identity. At the same time, by relying on the shared memories 
and symbols embodying a sense of struggle and reflecting the historic injustice and indignity 
suffered by the French-Canadian community in Québec, the Québécois nationalist movement 
has been able to maintain its nature as an expression of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of 
protest, which subsequently links the a sense of struggle and historic injustice to the 
conception of the Québécois national identity, while also promoting the idea that the perceived 
frontier between Francophone Québécois and Anglophone Canadians goes beyond simply 
language.      
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Chapter 6 
Development, Evocation, and Interpretation of ‘Shared Memories’ and Symbols 
At the origins of the contemporary nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec, key 
shared memories and symbols reflecting a sense of struggle, injustice, and oppression were 
relied upon as a means of effectuating a nationalist agitation aimed at creating a collective 
perception of the Flemish and Québécois nations and establishing a nationalist movement with 
mass appeal. Subsequently, these same shared memories and symbols have continued to be a 
vital resource for Flemish and Québécois nationalist in perpetuating an ethno-linguistic 
nationalism of protest in Flanders and Québec, which has been aimed at re-enforcing the 
conception of the Flemish and Québécois nations. Ultimately, it has been the perpetuation of 
this nationalist conception of the national identity, as defined by the tenets of a Flemish and 
Québécois ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, which accounts for the paralleling 
nationalist profiles in Flanders and Québec. 
   
6.1 Use of Shared Memories and Symbols within the Flemish Nationalist Movement  
 By the period following the end of the Second World War, the Flemish ethno-linguistic 
national identity had become fully entrenched in the collective conscious of Flemings in 
Belgium; and following an initial decline of Flemish nationalism due to the connotation of 
being linked to Nazi collaboration, Flemish nationalists would eventually become fully 
politicized and turn their attention to the defence of Flemish social and economic interests.
252
 
By the 1970s, Flemish nationalists achieved cultural autonomy for Flanders and had fully 
reversed the effects of the uneven development of modernization and the cultural division of 
labour, as Flanders became not only the richest region in Belgium but also one of the most 
prosperous regions in all of Europe. However, despite the gains and achievements of the 
Flemish Movement, contemporary Flemish nationalists have continued to evoke the shared 
memories and symbolism of the historic injustices and indignity suffered by the Flemish 
nation. This has been done as a means of perpetuating a sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism 
of protest, which remains the galvanizing force behind the Flemish nationalist movement.  
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6.1.1 The Battle of the Golden Spurs and the Lion of Flanders   
 On July 11
th
, 1302, the knights of King Philip IV of France suffered a shocking defeat 
at the hands of a militia from Flanders. A Flemish army of around 10,000 infantrymen had 
besieged the citadel of Courtrai, and the French set out to crush this resistance to King Philip’s 
subjection and lift the siege. With their backs to a river and shielded on their front by a 
formidable morass of streams and flooded ditches, the rebellious Flemish (predominantly 
guildsmen) committed themselves to either complete victory or defeat. After preliminary 
infantry skirmishes the French prematurely launched a catastrophic cavalry charge across 
unfavourable terrain. The Flemish withstood the initial surge of the French forces and 
counterattacked in a massacre that left at least half of the 2,500 or more French knights 
slaughtered. Hundreds of golden spurs were collected off the slain French knights and saved to 
memorialize the victory; thus the name, ‘Battle of the Golden Spurs.’253 
 The shared memories of the 1302 Battle of the Golden Spurs, or Guldensporenslag in 
Dutch, have been fundamental to the Flemish national identity formation. The battle has been 
perpetuated and romanticized in myth by Flemish nationalists, who have continually evoked it 
as being one of the earliest examples of Flemish resistance; and this despite the fact that the 
region of Flanders as we know it today was not a political entity at the time of the battle, and 
both opposing forces were actually ethnically mixed.
254
 
 The Battle of the Golden Spurs initially entered into the collective memory of the 
Flemings through the influence of author Henri Conscience’s 1838 novel, “De Leeuw van 
Vlaanderen” (“The Lion of Flanders”). Conscience’s novel was inspired by the ‘Romantic 
Movement’ and his own active part in the Belgian Revolution of 1830, which influenced 
Conscience to attempt to foster a sense of Flemish pride and self respect, but within the 
context of a Belgian national identity.
 
In fact, Conscience was himself was part of the French-
speaking bourgeoisie of the time.
255
 The book’s title was in reference to Robert of Bethune 
(also known as Robert III of Flanders), who, in Conscience’s story, is the saviour of the 
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Flemish army at the Battle of the Golden Spurs; however, historians have called into question 
Robert of Bethune’s presence at the battle, and many have pointed out that he probably did not 
even speak Dutch, but rather French. Nevertheless, the Flemish nationalist movement has 
influenced the manner in which Conscience’s novel is interpreted, with the imagined scenario 
of brave Flemings against the stubborn French playing a highly regarded role for the Flemish 
psyche. Consequently, “The Lion of Flanders” has been a useful resource of the nation-
building curriculum in Flemish classrooms.
256
  
 For Flemish nationalists, the Battle of the Golden Spurs remains a seminal shared 
memory of the Flemish national identity; the Flemish national day, the national flag, and the 
national anthem are all based on the famous battle, during which the ‘brave Flemings’ are said 
to have defeated the ‘cowardly French’.257 On June 6th, 1972, Evrard Raskin, a member of the 
Volksunie party, the principal Flemish nationalist party at the time, submitted a proposal to the 
precursor to the present Flemish Parliament, the Raad voor de Nederlandse 
Cultuurgemeenschap (the Cultural Council for the Dutch-Speaking Cultural Community), 
concerning the Flemish ‘national symbols’: the flag, the anthem, and the Flemish national day. 
In his proposal, the flag was to depict a black lion on a yellow background, which was the 
medieval emblem of the County of Flanders, the flag of the Flemish Movement, and a 
symbolic link to Henri Conscience’s novel, “The Lion of Flanders.”258 Raskin also proposed 
that the anthem should be the popular song, “De Vlaamse Leeuw” (“The Flemish Lion”), and 
that the Flemish national day should be on the anniversary of the Battle of the Golden Spurs, 
July 11
th
. According to Raskin, the three symbols were not new because the Flemish people 
were already using them, and his proposition just attempted to “confer an official status to 
something that already existed.”259  
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 The Battle of the Golden Spurs is hailed as a Flemish victory, and thus it can be viewed 
as a shared memory of Flemish ‘national glory’, harking back to a ‘golden age’. However, 
contemporary Flemish nationalists also view the battle as an example of Flemish resistance, 
and contextualize it as being analogous to the more recent struggles against injustices inflicted 
on the Flemish nation by Francophones in Belgium. In fact, in the Flemish national anthem, 
“De Vlaamse Leeuw,” which was written by Hippoliet Van Peene in July 1847, and based on 
the Flemish victory at the Battle of the Golden Spurs, the song’s reference to the ‘enemy’ was 
originally intended to refer to the invading forces from France during the battle in 1302; 
however, Flemish nationalists have altered the symbolism of the anthem and directed its 
meaning at Francophone Walloons in Belgium. On July 6
th
, 1973, a decree by the Cultural 
Council for the Dutch-speaking Cultural Community proclaimed the first two stanzas to be the 
official national anthem of Flanders:     
“They will never tame him, the proud Flemish Lion, 
Even if they threaten his freedom with fetters and with shouts. 
They will never tame him, as long as one Fleming lives. 
As long as the Lion can claw, as long as he has teeth.” 
 
Chorus: “They will never tame him, as long as one Fleming lives. 
As long as the Lion can claw, as long as he has teeth. 
As long as the Lion can claw, as long as he has teeth.” 
 
“Time devours cities, no thrones will ever last, 
Armies may go under, but a people never dies. 
The enemy comes marching in; surrounded by mortal danger. 
We laugh at his anger: the Flemish Lion is here!” 
(Chorus).
260
 
 
                                                          
260 Only the first two stanzas above are actually sung on official occasions; however, the full version of “De Vlaamse Leeuw” 
(the Flemish National anthem) finishes with following stanzas: 
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  Despite the historical evidence to the contrary, Flemish nationalists have reinterpreted 
the Battle of the Golden Spurs via the mythicization of the battle by Conscience’s novel, “The 
Lion of Flanders,” in order to create a shared memory of Flemish resistance and victory in the 
face of an imposing French (or Francophone) menace; and thus, ultimately fitting the battle 
into the ethno-linguistic paradigm of the Flemish Movement. This shared memory of the 
Battle of the Golden Spurs, and the symbolic links to it, have become integral to the Flemish 
identity formation. Part of what it means to be Flemish is defined by the French (or 
Francophones) being understood as the historical enemy of Flanders. Moreover, the continued 
evocation of the shared memories of the Battle of the Golden Spurs and “The Lion of 
Flanders” helps perpetuate the Flemish nationalist movement’s sense struggle and resistance, 
which are tenets of the Flemish ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest.   
 
6.1.2 First World War and the IJzertoren (Tower of Yser) 
 The shared memories and symbolism of the injustices suffered by Dutch-speaking 
Belgian soldiers during the First World War have been fundamental in the formation of the 
Flemish national identity. Flemings made up the large majority of frontline soldiers in the 
Belgian Army during the First World War, but only accounted for 53 percent of junior officers 
(a number that would grow smaller over the course of the war), and only 20 percent of the 
senior officers. There were also proportionally more Walloons serving elsewhere in the army 
other than in the infantry; for example, in the armament factories in France and England, or in 
the technical units of the army, such as the artillery.
261
 By 1918, 70 percent of the Belgian 
casualties had been Flemings, most killed by German troops on the frontlines at the banks of 
the Yser river (IJzer rivier in Dutch). Moreover, many of the casualties were due to Dutch-
speaking Flemish soldiers not understanding the orders of their French-speaking officers. 
 There was also sense of isolation among Flemish soldiers, in what was effectively a 
French-speaking Belgian army, and Dutch-speaking soldiers began to feel the victims of 
discrimination. Therefore, in an act of Flemish solidarity, groups began to form in which 
Dutch-speaking soldiers would trade stories and discuss Flemish literature, for example 
Conscience’s “The Lion of Flanders.”262 Flemish intellectuals and students began to partake in 
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activism, especially after 1916, when the Belgian government publicly refused the proposition 
to make the University of Gent a Dutch institution. This activism would eventually lead to the 
‘Front Movement’.263 
  The symbolism of a Flemish sense of injustice during the First World War began to 
take root early on. The Front Movement compelled Flemish soldiers to make a distinction 
between their perception of nationhood and that of the Walloons, prompting the desire for a 
separate and nationalistic recognition for fallen Flemish soldiers. One of the groups of the 
Front Movement, known as Heldenhulde (Homage to Heroes), created distinct tombstones 
with a ‘Flemish cross’ (or Heldenhulde tombstone) with the inscription AVV-VVK, which 
stood for Alles voor Vlaanderen, Vlaanderen voor Kristus (Everything for Flanders, Flanders 
for Christ), based on a poem by Cyril Verschaeve. The tombstones were made possible by 
donations from soldiers, municipal councils, and the citizens of Flanders; the Belgian 
government did not provide any financial assistance for them.
 264  
 
As the First World War raged on, the Front Movement became a stronger and more 
controversial aspect of Belgian politics. The Belgian military’s opposition to the Flemish 
nationalist movement grew and the hostility towards the Front Movement was directed at the 
most available, visible, and concrete symbol of Flemish opposition to Belgian rule—the 
Heldenhulde tombstones. In 1917 and 1918, measures were taken by the Belgian military 
against what was perceived to be a Flemish insurrection against a unified Belgium, resulting in 
participants of the Front Movement being incarcerated in camps.
265 
Then in late 1917, a series 
of acts of sabotage against the Flemish crosses were committed, and rumours circulated that 
the Flemish crosses would be replaced by a uniform, Belgian government imposed model. By 
January 1918, in reaction to these events, having a family member buried beneath a 
Heldenhulde became an important public political act. Many of the families that had been 
neutral in choosing a tombstone became more inclined to opt for a Flemish cross. Then on the 
nights of February 8
th
 and 9
th
, 1918, thirty-six of the Heldenhulde tombstones were defaced in 
the cemetery at Oeren-Alveringem, with the AVV/VVK inscription having been filled in with 
concrete. Years later, on May 27
th
, 1925, on the order of the Belgian Minister of Defense 
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Albert Hellebaut, more than five hundred Heldenhulde tombstones were crushed and then 
used in the construction of a road in Adinkerke.
266 
These acts of vandalism and the disregard 
for the Heldenhulde tombstones only served to re-enforced their significance, and helped 
establish the Flemish cross as a symbolic link to the ‘shared memories’ of the injustices and 
discrimination inflicted on Flemish soldiers by French-speaking Belgians during the First 
World War.  
 By November 11, 1918, over one thousand Flemish crosses had been erected, as 
church cemeteries became filled with them. After the armistice brought the First World War to 
an end, more Flemish crosses were erected, creating a clear delineation within the cemeteries 
between the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking soldiers. Then in 1927, it was decided 
that the Heldenhulde tombstones would be extended to all Flemish veterans of World War 
One, and over the course of the next ten years new commemorative Heldenhulde tombstones 
would be placed on the graves of other Flemish soldiers who died during the war, but who did 
not initially receive such acknowledgment.
267
 
 Following the First World War, as early as 1919, annual pilgrimages to the site of the 
Flemish battles began. A governing body, the ‘Yser Pilgrimage Committee’, was organized to 
manage pilgrimages to IJzer (Yser), in Flanders. The committee then purchased a parcel of 
land along the Yser River to establish a permanent memorial. Since so many of the Flemish 
men had been interred in local village cemeteries, members of the Front Movement decided to 
define a site that would serve to collectively recognize all the ‘martyred’ men of Flanders. On 
the afternoon of August 31, 1924, during the fifth IJzerbedevaart (Yser pilgrimage) at the city 
of Diksmuide, a city which was completely destroyed during the Battle of the Yser, it was 
decided to bring together the threatened Heldenhulde tombstones under the mantle of a 
gigantic cross, the IJzertoren (the Tower of Yser).
268
 
 On August 25, 1930, the IJzertoren memorial was inaugurated in Diskmuide, Flanders, 
which was chosen for its central location to the battlefields and its proximity to the Yser River.  
For Flemish nationalists, the IJzertoren represents one of the most important symbolic links to 
the shared memory of the injustices inflicted upon the Flemish nation at the hands of 
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Francophone Walloons during the First World War. At the time of the inauguration, a song 
called “O Cross of the IJzer” was sung, which reflected the principles of the Front Movement 
and the palpable level of nationalism directed towards this imposing symbol of Flemish 
Catholic martyrdom, patriotism, and pride.
269
 The original IJzertoren was fifty metres high, 
looming dramatically over the Yser plain with its cruciform top bearing the AVV/VVK 
inscription. Another dedication quoted the priest and poet Cyriel Verschaeve: “Here lie their 
remains, like seed in the sand. Hope for thy harvest, Oh Flanders land.”270 The memorial’s 
message posthumously isolated the Flemings among the Belgian dead and redefined their 
deaths as sacrifices for Flanders, with that sacrifice’s ‘harvest’ effectively spelling out a 
separate Flanders from Belgium. In short, the IJzertoren was as bluntly an anti-Belgian 
memorial as could be devised by the fiercely separatist Flemish nationalist culture of that 
time.
271
 
 German forces would again occupied Belgium again during the Second World War, 
and the Nazis would once again implement a policy of Flamenpolitik, taking advantage of the 
language and cultural division of Belgium, and enacting laws to protect and encourage the 
Dutch language in Flanders. This policy allowed the Nazis to effectively couch the invasion of 
Belgium within the rhetoric of liberating the Flemish nation from the oppression of a French-
speaking Belgian state; and although the pre-war leaders of the Flemish Movement were 
opposed to the German advances, some of the young Flemish activists were more susceptible 
to the promises of the Nazi occupiers to form an autonomous Flanders.
272
 
 During these years of Nazi occupation, many Francophone Belgians came to regard the 
IJzertoren as a representation of the collaboration of the few Flemish nationalists who were 
activists in cooperation with the German occupiers. However, for Flemings the IJzertoren 
served in memory of those members of the Flemish community who died as a result of the 
war, and it honoured those who had been deported and alienated from their towns and 
communities. The monument at Yser was severely damaged during the Second World War, 
but the pilgrimages to the IJzertoren continued and even became increasingly elaborate and 
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nationalistic.
273
 Soon after the war, the IJzertoren became the responsibility of the Belgian 
government. Six months later, on the morning of March 14, 1946, explosives damaged the 
tower and a hole was created on the south side, approximately ten metres wide. Serious 
damage was also done to the circular staircase and elevator inside the building. A second, 
decisive attack took place on the next night, March 15, 1946, and the original monument was 
destroyed. It has been suspected that the act was perpetrated by Francophone radicals within 
the Belgian military who were opposed to the Flemish Movement.
274
    
 Several Flemish cultural groups and Flemish separatist groups publicly protested the 
Yser Tower’s destruction. In fact, the board of one of the groups, Het Vlaamse Kruis (The 
Flemish Cross), expressed its anger by emphasizing that the tower was a sacred object and 
labelling the destruction as a blasphemous act of ‘desecration’, which violated the graves of 
the heroes who rested there as a symbol of Flemish greatness. The word ‘desecration’ was 
chosen to make the IJzertoren analogous to the Christian context of its inception, which linked 
the tower to the martyrdom of Flemish soldiers.
275
 Margaret Olin explains that the intentional 
destruction of a monument gives a group the ability to redirect the cultural memory, and thus 
appropriate what has been built. Olin argues that the potential for destruction or defacement 
may be the most meaningful aspect of a monument’s existence as an object.276 The first 
impression of a monument’s power pertains to its size, design, and location, but ultimately a 
monument is defined less by what it looks like than by what it represents or how people utilize 
it. The monument expresses the power and the sense of the society that gives it meaning. 
Designed to be permanent, a monument’s symbolism is changed as it re-defines the past in 
terms of the present and future.
277
 
 In 1948, the Comité voor Herstel van het IJzerkruis (The Committee for the Repair of 
the Yser Cross) decided that since the main tenets of the Front Movement (self-government 
for Flanders, no more war, and peace among all people no matter their conviction) had been 
important attributes of the original IJzertoren, a very visible acknowledgment of these 
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principles was to be expressed in a newly built monument. It was also decided that a gate 
dedicated to peace would be constructed by incorporating the fragments of the destroyed 
tower, transforming an act of violence (the destruction of the original IJzertoren) into a 
symbol of benevolence. The gate would also mark the entrance to the site of the “martyrs’ 
graves” within the crypt of the original tower.278 On May 22nd, 1949, the first stone from the 
original destroyed tower was placed as the foundations of the Paxpoort (Peace Gate) at the 
monument. Then in February 1952, the Yser Pilgrimage Committee decided that the new 
IJzertoren would be rebuilt in the shape of the previous monument, but only bigger (85 
metres). Construction on the second IJzertoren began in July of 1952, and finally, on August 
22
nd
, 1965, during the thirty-eighth IJzerbedevaart (Yser Pilgrimage), the new IJzertoren was 
dedicated to the ‘martyrs’ who died for Flanders. However, during the dedicatory speeches, 
the Christian and pacifist aspects of the site were overshadowed by the expressions of Flemish 
nationalism.
279
  
 The First World War resulted in the solidification of the Flemish identity; the Front 
Movement disseminated the stories of the discrimination and injustices suffered by Dutch-
speaking soldiers in a Francophone Belgian Army. At the time, this phenomenon was 
compounded by the shared memories of other examples of indignity imposed on Flemings 
since the creation of the Belgian state in 1830. For example, the Belgian Constitution had been 
only written in French, and for Flemish nationalists it was an unforgivable affront to the 
Flemish people that the fundamental Belgian charter was not translated into the language of 
the majority community in Belgium.
280
 There was also the fact that the Belgian judiciary had 
been a French institution, and Flemings could not receive a trial in Dutch until 1898.
281
 
Finally, there was the refusal to establish Dutch-speaking universities, most notably the 
Belgian government’s refusal of a proposition from members of the Front Movement during 
the First World War to make the University of Gent a Dutch institution once the war was over.  
Thus, beyond the direct symbolic linkage to the suffering, sacrifice, and martyrdom of 
Flemish soldiers during the First World War, the IJzertoren also became the symbolic 
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embodiment of the Flemish national identity, which was rooted in the shared memories of the 
linguistic discrimination and injustices suffered by the Dutch-speaking community in 
Belgium. The symbolic importance of the IJzertoren to the Flemish national identity was 
confirmed in 1986, when the Flemish Parliament officially proclaimed the monument as the 
“memorial of Flemish emancipation.”282  
  
6.1.3 The ‘Occupation’ of Flanders and the Cultural Division of Labour 
 A founding principle of the Flemish Movement was the linguistic ‘decolonization’ of 
Flanders, which had said to have been ‘occupied’ by the French language. 283 During the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Dutch language in Flanders was associated with 
small agricultural producers and industrial workers in Walloon-owned factories, while middle 
and upper-class Flemings were assimilated into the French language and culture as a means of 
obtaining social mobility.
284
 This cultural division of labour has deeply impacted Flemish 
nationalists’ sentiments of territoriality regarding Flanders, and it is largely rooted in the 
perception that the Flemish Movement has been a crusade of re-conquest of Flemish territory 
occupied by a ‘mafia’ of Francophone bourgeoisies.285  
 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Flemish nationalists adopted a ‘territorial 
principle’, calling for a monolingual Dutch Flanders. The sentiment among many Flemish 
nationalists was that it was necessary to erase any trace of the intrusion of the French language 
in Flanders, a sentiment that was reinforced by the shared memories of what had been 
regarded as the painful linguistic colonization and oppression of the Flemish people at the 
hands of the Francophone invaders.
286
 Flemish nationalists argued that the characteristics of 
the Flemish people could only find fullest expression when the Flemings had finally acquired 
a natural political unit of their own in their historical territory. Thus, the concept of the 
‘Flemish people’ is intimately linked to the territorial conception of Flanders.  
 It is taken among Flemish nationalists as absolutely self-evident that Flemings have 
their own culture, their own peculiar characteristics, and their own eigenheid (unicity). This 
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Flemish culture, or ‘unicity’, is assumed to be age-old and is said to have persisted throughout 
Flanders’ history of occupation and oppression by ‘others’. 287  Therefore, as a means of 
maintaining the sense of national struggle by an oppressed and martyred people (tenets 
embodied within the Flemish ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest), Flamingants have 
perpetuated the image of a Flanders that was occupied, dominated, and exploited throughout 
the history of the region (most notably by the Franco-Belgian bourgeoisie); and these 
characteristics have come to define the identity of the Flemings.
288
  
 In this context of territoriality and ‘occupation’, the linguistic situation in Brussels is 
used to evoke important shared memories for Flemish nationalists, who view the Belgian 
capital as historically Flemish. The present predominance of French in Brussels is seen as the 
product of the historic oppression by Francophones in Belgium. Jan Blommaert explains that, 
as far as Flemish nationalists are concerned, Brussels is not naturally a Francophone city, but 
it has been made into a Francophone city by the ‘Flemish-hating Belgian bourgeoisies’.289 For 
Flamingants, Brussels has become the Jerusalem of the Flemish people, with the 
Francophones who have installed themselves in the Flemish municipalities on the periphery of 
the city being viewed as veritable Walloon ‘colonizers’ of Flemish territory.290 Thus, Flemish 
nationalists view Brussels as a symbolic link to the collective memory of the Francophone 
colonization of Flanders, and the Brussels periphery remains a battle-ground for Flemish 
nationalists who fear a re-Frenchification of Flanders, due to an ever-expanding olievlek (oil-
stain) of Francophone migration into the region. Having successfully established the linguistic 
integrity of Flanders, Flemish nationalists are staunchly determined to defend their national 
homeland against any possible aggressor, and in that respect language has maintained its great 
symbolic value for the Flemish identity.
291
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6.2 Use of Shared Memories and Symbols within the Québécois Nationalist Movement  
 The nationalist intelligentsia in Québec began the conceptualization of a Québécois 
identity in the 1950s, when nationalist academics pursued a scholarly inquiry into the state of 
the French-Canadian community in Québec. Then, over the course of the Quiet Revolution of 
the 1960s, and on into the 1970s, the conception of the Québécois national identity was further 
shaped and propagated by the agitation of the Québécois nationalist movement, relying 
heavily on the shared memories and symbols of the past. The Québécois national identity has 
been defined by nationalists in the context of the ‘melancholia’ and ‘trauma’ caused by the 
historical injustices and indignity suffered by the French-Canadian community;
292
 and 
therefore, the Québécois nationalist movement has been developed as an expression of ethno-
linguistic nationalism of protest. By the late 1970s, the sovereignty movement had become the 
predominant voice of the Québécois nationalist movement. As a result, the shared memories 
and symbols that perpetuate the Québécois national identity have emphasized a sense of the 
Québécois nation’s struggle to completely and freely assert itself as an independent state.  
 
6.2.1 Trauma of ‘La Conquête’ and the Plains of Abraham 
 The shared memories of the so-called ‘Conquest of New France’ have been a 
fundamental component in shaping Québécois nationalism and national identity. On 
September 12
th
, 1759, during the Seven Years War, British soldiers clashed with French and 
militia forces on the Plains of Abraham in New France (modern-day Québec), with the British 
emerging victorious. The British victory signalled the subjugation of the French colonists in 
North America; shortly after the defeat on the Plains of Abraham, France was resolved to the 
fact that it was too expensive to maintain the defence of New France and ceded it to British 
control in the 1763 Treaty of Paris. The loss of New France to British rule has profoundly 
impacted the collective memory of Francophones in Québec to this very day.
293
 The shared 
memories of the ‘Conquest’ are used by Québécois nationalists to explain the phenomenon of 
an uneven socio-economic development disfavouring Francophones, and to highlight the 
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subsequent imposition of a cultural division of labour resulting in historic socio-economic and 
political inequalities for Francophones in Québec.
294
      
 During the period following the Second World War, debate arose among Québec 
historians over the real social, economic, and political ramifications of the Conquest. This 
focus on analyzing the lasting effects of the British capture of New France was led by 
nationalist historian Lionel Groulx, who inspired a group of young historians at the Université 
de Montréal (such as Guy Frégault, Maurice Séguin, and Michel Brunet) to develop what 
would became the nationalist interpretation of the Conquest.
295
 According to this nationalist 
perspective, the Conquest was a decisive setback for the French-Canadian community, which 
had previously been progressing comfortably, both socio-economically and politically. The 
community was ‘decapitated’ by the return of many of its elites to France in the wake of the 
Conquest, and those who did remain were only permitted to occupy subordinate roles in an 
economy and a political system that was dominated and controlled by the British. These 
nationalist historians also claim that due to the uneven development in Québec, French-
Canadians established a Catholic conservative ideology, which helped lead to the 
entrenchment of the myth that Francophones were unsuited for leadership in business, and 
which exacerbated the cultural division of labour, thus setting back Francophones in Québec 
even further. The interpretation of the Conquest by the nationalist historians from what has 
come to be known as the ‘Montreal school’, helped to lay the foundations for the resurgence 
of nationalism in Québec during the 1960s, and has greatly influenced the Québécois 
nationalist movement over the last half-century.
296
  
 In the context of the Conquest, contemporary nationalists in Québec have perpetuated 
the sentiment that the Québécois nation is a ‘conquered’ and ‘colonized’ people, and that the 
only way for them to overcome this plight is to obtain their own country through secession 
from Canada.
297
 This fact was clearly exemplified by René Levesque, the first leader of the 
Parti Québécois, who would often make reference to the Conquest in his writings and 
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speeches.
298
 For many Québécois nationalists the spectre of the Conquest lies behind the 
contemporary political debates concerning Québec and the ‘rest of Canada’. The military loss 
of New France at the hands of the British has been turned into a ‘psychological trauma’ for the 
Québécois people, with the Plains of Abraham being the symbolic link to the shared memories 
of the tragedies and injustices suffered by the French-Canadian community in Québec under 
British, and later English-Canadian domination.
299
 Thus, despite the fact that a large and ever 
increasing number of Canadians are not of British descent, let alone from Anglo-Saxon 
origins, sovereigntists still view the paradigm of Québec’s place in Canada in the context of 
the Conquest. The ‘Canada anglais’ (English-Canada) have superseded ‘les Anglais’ (literally 
the English, but also a term employed to refer to all peoples of British descent) as the 
imposing force for the Francophones of Québec—with Québec’s Anglophone minority 
(concentrated in Montréal) regarded by many Québécois nationalists as the uninvited and 
unwanted successors of the British conquerors.
300
 This perspective is the embodiment of the 
ethno-linguistic delimitation of the Québécois national identity, defining those who speak 
French in Québec and having ancestral links to the anciens Canadiens français (the original 
French colonists of New France) as having ethnic membership in the Québécois nation, and 
those who speak English as defined as ‘Canadians’. Subsequently, the shared memories of the 
Conquest encourage an exclusive and ethnic definition of the Québécois nation that is 
subscribed to by many within the contemporary Québécois nationalist movement. 
 For sovereigntists, the independence of Québec is viewed in the context of the liberty 
of an adult, with Québec’s place in Canada being akin to the outmoded dominance of a parent 
over a child. Such rhetoric allows nationalists to psychologise history and to discuss the shared 
memories of the nation’s historical narrative as if they were the history of a person.301 Richard 
Handler explains that nationalists often make use of the concept of normalcy. Handler states 
that for nationalists “the period of submission, in its very length, is said to be ‘abnormal’—an 
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unnaturally prolonged childhood.”302 It is for this reason that the shared memories of the 
Conquest have been vital to the propagation of the contemporary Québécois nationalist 
movement, in terms of maintaining its character as an expression of an ethno-linguistic 
nationalism of protest. This includes the continued nationalist discourse conveying the 
abnormality of Québec’s situation as a Canadian province. It is the opinion of sovereigntists 
that only independence can return the Québécois nation to a sense of normalcy because it is 
assumed that the development of New France would have proceeded normally had it not been 
interrupted by the Conquest. A prime example of this sentiment can be drawn from influential 
nationalist scholar Fernand Dumont, who stated that with the sovereignty of Québec certain 
struggles ensuing from the Conquest would finally “die quiet deaths,” providing the 
foundation for a new discursivity, a new vocabulary of identity, and a new referent for the 
Québécois in the definition of their collective identity.
303
  
 Therefore, the shared memories of the Conquest and the symbolism of the Plains of 
Abraham remain vital to the contemporary nationalist movement in Québec as a vehicle for 
the continued sentiment of protestation against the status of the Québécois people, in terms of 
being ‘conquered’ and ‘dominated’, as well as finishing the process of decolonization, which 
for sovereigntists can only be finalized through the independence of Québec.  
 
6.2.2 Lower Canada Rebellions of 1837-1838 and Les Patriotes 
 In Lower Canada (modern-day Québec) during the autumn of 1837, a group of men 
referred to as les Patriotes (the Patriots), who were predominantly of French descent but also 
counting a number of Englishmen and Irishmen among them, revolted against British colonial 
forces leading to a direct armed conflict with the British army in 1837, and then again in 1838. 
In the aftermath of the rebellions, the British government sent Lord Durham to investigate the 
uprising; after which Durham concluded that one of the measures needed was the immediate 
populating of Lower Canada with subjects loyal to the British Crown, as well as the 
implementation of the Act of Union in 1840, which united Upper and Lower Canada.
304
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 As a means of survival, French Canadians developed an ethnic nationalism founded on 
traditional Catholic and rural values; and therefore, the Catholic Church initially discouraged 
commemorating the Lower Canada Rebellion or les Patriotes because of their republican, 
non-sectarian, and anti-clerical overtones.
305
 The evocation of the shared memories of the 
Patriots would coincide with the rise of more liberal and left-wing varieties of Québec 
nationalism during the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, which looked more towards the 
independence of Quebec. With more nationalist rhetoric calling for Québec’s independence, 
the red, white, and green flag of the Patriots came to be a symbolic representation of Québec’s 
struggle against British (and later English-Canadian) oppression and the fight for 
independence.
306
 
 The 1837-38 Lower Canada Rebellions were inspired by the ideals of the French and 
American Revolutions, and were also related to the similar demands for autonomous political 
institutions of responsible government during the rebellion in Upper Canada (present-day 
Ontario), which was led by William Lyon Mackenzie, a Scottish immigrant.
307
 In fact, the 
movement of les Patriotes consisted of a partnership of likeminded Francophones and 
Anglophones in Lower Canada at the time. Despite this fact, certain contemporary nationalist 
elites and academics in Québec have re-interpreted the Patriots’ republican motivation as 
being within the context of the larger struggle of the Québécois, making the British repression 
of the Patriots’ fight for liberty interchangeable with the socio-economic repression and 
political domination of the Québécois at the hands of ‘English-Canada’.308  
 The leaders and combatants of the Patriots’ Rebellions have become ‘martyrs’ in the 
collective memory of Québécois. For example, Louis-Joseph Papineau, who was the political 
voice of the Patriots movement as leader of the Parti des patriotes (Party of the Patriots), is 
regarded as a glorious leader who was valiant in defeat; this is regardless of the fact that 
Papineau was not a combatant, nor had he ever taken up arms during the Lower Canada 
Rebellions in 1837 and 1838. Moreover, Papineau was part of the ‘seigneurial’ class of Lower 
Canada at the time (the semi-feudal, landowning class that originated in the North American 
                                                          
305 Garth Stevenson, “The Politics of Remembrance in Irish and Quebec Nationalism,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science/Revue canadienne de science poltiqiue 37, no. 4 (2004): 914. 
306 See Appendix C. 
307 Ibid., 915. 
308 Gilles Bibeau, “Tropismes québécois. Je me souviens dans l’oubli,” Anthropologie et Société 19, no. 3 (1995): 161.  
 
 
99 
 
colonies of New France), while other Patriot leaders were members of Lower Canada’s 
bourgeoisie. Therefore, some historians have pointed to an ideological ambivalence and 
limitation to the political ambitions of the leadership of les Patriotes.
309
 Nevertheless, during 
the Quiet Revolution nationalist intellectuals in Québec at the time, who voiced their opinions 
in the political revues “Liberté” and “Parti pris,” attempted to shape the shared memories of 
the 1837 and 1838 Lower Canada Rebellions by describing the struggle for independence of 
les Patriotes as analogous to the movements towards independence of the colonized people of 
Africa and Asia.
310
  
In recent years, mainstream Québec nationalists have come to embrace the images, 
names, and symbols of les Patriotes. A significant example of this came in 2002, when 
Québec Premier Bernard Landry, of the sovereigntist Parti Québécois, announced that the 
former fête de Dollard would henceforth be known as the fête des Patriotes (celebration of the 
Patriots).
311
 In the official motion by the PQ declaring une Journée nationale des patriotes (a 
national day of the Patriots), Premier Landry explained that the day was to underline the 
importance of the struggle of les Patriotes of 1837-1838, for the recognition of the Québécois 
nation, for its political liberty, and for the establishment of a democratic government. Premier 
Landry also stated that, “the collective memory (of the Québécois) will never forget the tragic 
and bloody outcome of this episode.”312         
 
6.2.3 La Révolution Tranquille, Territoriality, and the Cultural Division of Labour  
 In the wake of the Second World War, Québec’s economy entered a period of 
modernization largely due to a massive influx of American capital investment aimed at 
exploiting Québec’s natural resources. However, this modernization would exacerbate the 
socio-economic inequalities suffered by Francophones as industry was still controlled by 
American or English-Canadian interests, and the language of the workplace and commerce 
was English. Moreover, the social mobility of Francophones was limited, leaving them heavily 
present in the industrial and tertiary sectors, while preventing French speakers from obtaining 
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positions of economic importance and decision-making. Faced with continued limits on their 
social mobility despite Québec’s modernization, nationalist elites sought to create a greater 
awareness of the shared memories of the historic cultural division of labour in Québec, which, 
as nationalist academics belonging to the ‘Montréal School’ explained, stemmed from British 
domination of Québec after the Conquest.
313
 Ultimately, Québécois nationalists would 
characterize this linguistic discrimination as evidence of a national oppression and the forced 
subordination of the Québécois nation to English-Canada.
314
  
 During the Révolution Tranquille (Quiet Revolution) of the 1960s, Francophone 
political elites in Québec’s Liberal Party set out to use the provincial political and economic 
institutions as a means of reversing the effects of what had been a linguistically defined 
cultural division of labour, and as a vehicle of promoting socio-economic mobility for 
Francophones.
315
 It was during this period that the nationalist movement in Québec, whose 
authority and influence were greatly enhanced, adopted a more restricted, neo-nationalist, and 
territorially based identity of being Québécois.
316
 As a result, Québec became the national 
territory of the Québécois nation and Québec’s political and economic institutions became a 
veritable ‘nation state’, which was viewed as the means of achieving the socio-political 
emancipation of this newly ‘awakened’ ethno-linguistic nation. 317  As a result, the shared 
memories of the Quiet Revolution continue to have an important impact in terms of the 
definition of the Québécois national identity, and remain a powerful and significant instrument 
of perpetuating a sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest within the contemporary 
Québec sovereigntist movement. In particular, the shared memories of the Quiet Revolution 
serve the purposes of reinforcement and inspiration, promoting pride in the Québécois nation 
and its achievements, and for a great number of people, confidence that Québec has the 
capabilities to achieve and maintain the status of a sovereign state.
318
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 In 1969, the final report from the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism provided tangible evidence of the economic disadvantages faced by French-
Canadians, including a level of salary earnings dramatically lower compared to that of 
Anglophones.
319
 This would act as a catalyst for the Québécois nationalist movement to 
become increasingly preoccupied with the socio-economic situation of Francophone 
Québécois during the 1970s, especially concerning language rights, as a means of overcoming 
the cultural division of labour. Québécois nationalist leaders, namely the political leaders of 
Québec’s sovereignty movement, would compare the situation of Francophones in Québec to 
that of English-Canadians, underlining the socio-economic disparities.
320
  
 Then in 1974, the Liberal government of Québec passed Bill 22, making French the 
official language of Québec and promoting the use of French at the workplace. And as the 
Québécois nationalist movement transitioned to being focused on obtaining ‘sovereignty’ for 
Québec, which came in the wake of the election of the Parti Québécois in 1976, the 
entrenchment of French as the vehicular language of work and commerce in Québec was 
furthered with the passing of Bill 101.
321
 The territorialization of Québec as the homeland of 
the Québécois identity was established through the construction of this linguistic frontier, 
defining Québec as Canada’s only officially unilingual French-speaking province, and where 
the society was first and foremost a French-speaking one; and therefore, the French language 
has become the essence of Québec nationalists’ claims of Québec society being ‘distinct’.322  
 Furthermore, the defence of the French language within Québec, most notably in 
Montréal, acts as a clarion call for contemporary Québécois nationalists, who utilize the 
shared memories of the historic socio-economic injustices suffered by Francophones in 
Québec—namely the limitations on socio-economic mobility due to the imposition of a 
cultural division of labour—as means of perpetuating the sense of ethno-linguistic nationalism 
of protest within the Québécois nationalist movement. More specifically, one of the means by 
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which the contemporary Québec sovereigntist movement engages in its nationalist agitation is 
by relying on the shared memories of the victory for the Québécois nation that was the Quiet 
Revolution, in overcoming the cultural division of labour and the limits to socio-economic 
mobility, while simultaneously warning of the enduring threat of a return to a pre-Quiet 
Revolution domination of Québec by English-Canada.  
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Conclusion 
 The primary objective of this dissertation has been to develop a clear understanding of 
why the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements have maintained strikingly similar 
nationalist profiles. In analyzing the present state of both nationalist movements it becomes 
evident that they share a paralleling discourse, cultural-linguistic agenda, political strategy, 
and objectives, despite clear structural and socio-demographic differences. This is exemplified 
most notably by the fact that in Flanders, just as in Québec, the nationalist movement 
continues to be focused on socio-political concerns in seeking the full political independence 
of the nation; and in both nationalist movements, the justification for separation is that it is 
viewed as the sole means of assuring the protection and vitality of each nation’s culture and 
language. However, when considering the similarities between the contemporary Flemish and 
Québécois nationalist movements, in juxtaposition with a comparison of the current economic, 
political, and socio-demographic situation of Flanders within Belgium and Québec within 
Canada, an explanation for the analogous nature of the two nationalist movements becomes 
less evident.  
 The paralleling profiles of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements are 
particularly curious when considering the present situation of the region of Flanders, which 
carries the demographic weight in Belgium, has considerable political autonomy (as well as 
having the most representation in the Belgian federal Parliament), and possesses the strongest 
economy out of Belgium’s three regions. Having established such an advantageous position in 
Belgium, the question arises as to why the Flemish nationalist movement has not transitioned 
to manifesting an expression of ‘majority nationalism’,323 rather than maintaining an ethno-
linguistic nationalism of protest similar to that which is found in Québec?    
 It is only when tracing back along the historical development of both the contemporary 
Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements that we find a common antecedent variable, a 
linguistically based ‘cultural division of labour’, which resulted in the development of similar 
                                                          
323 Rather than seeking to impose an institutional and political recognition of the national identity on the state (as is the case 
with ‘nationalism of protest’), ‘majority nationalism’ is expressed by state institutions and organisms that act as an 
intermediary in articulating the national identity and mobilisation, while the politics of the state are concerned with ‘nation-
building’ in terms of affirming a national language, culture, or common identity to citizens: André Lecours and Geneviève 
Nootens, “Comprendre le nationalism majoritaire,” in Les Nationalismes majoritaires contemporains: identité, mémoire, 
pouvoir, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon, André Lecours, and Geneviève Nootens (Montréal: Les Éditions Québec Amérique, 
2007), 32-33.     
 
 
104 
 
manifestations of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest that has continuously defined the 
conception of both national identities. It is this common causal variable that most clearly 
explains why the contemporary nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec share 
comparable nationalist profiles. As Miroslav Hroch explains, in order to compare national 
movements it is necessary to establish a ‘periodization’, which not only permits a synchronic 
comparison, but also one according to analogous situations.
324
 Therefore, as a means of 
understanding the similar nature of the contemporary Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements, our comparative analysis has demonstrated the necessity of analysing the ‘causal 
chain’ of a nationalist movement’s development; or more specifically, the historical factors 
that act as a catalyst in providing the political and social environment that permits the 
nationalist movement to germinate and resonate within a society. In the case of Flanders and 
Québec, that catalyst was a cultural division of labour defined along linguistic lines, which 
limited the socio-economic mobility of Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium and French-
speaking Québécois in Canada. Ultimately, our historical comparative analysis has illustrated 
that the similar nature of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist profiles has not simply been 
the result of both cases being mobilizations of ‘stateless’ nations that have mirroring linguistic 
characteristics; instead, we have demonstrated that the analogous historical socio-economic 
factors have been extremely important in terms of understanding the comparable nationalist 
profiles of both nationalist movements today. 
 By incorporating the vast scholarship that has been developed on the study of nations 
and nationalism, as well as the studies focusing on the Flemish and Québécois nationalist 
movements themselves, we have been successful in gaining a comprehensive understanding of 
the paralleling factors that have resulted in the development and continuation of the similar 
expressions of nationalism in Flanders and Québec. Specifically, we have relied upon the 
modernist analysis of the effects of an ‘uneven development’ and the subsequent cultural 
division of labour, which, in turn, has the capacity to act as a galvanizing force in establishing 
a community’s solidarity and a sense of cohesiveness for the perception of the national 
identity. This effect comes to fruition through a nationalist agitation on the part of academics 
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and elites who are seeking to overcome the imposed limitations to their socio-economic 
mobility—a phenomenon explained by the ‘reactive ethnicity perspective’.  
 However, as we have demonstrated in this dissertation, it does not suffice to simply 
analyze and compare the historical events that have acted as antecedent variables in 
influencing a nationalist movement’s inception. In addition to this, equal attention must be 
paid to the manner in which the character of a nationalist movement has been perpetuated 
through its development, right up to its present state—in other words, the ‘causal mechanism’. 
In the case of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, this causal mechanism has 
essentially been the perpetuation of an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest through the use 
of shared memories and symbols. Thus, within our analysis the principles of ethno-symbolism 
were employed in regard to the importance of shared memories and their symbolic reflections, 
which are used by nationalists as a means of reaching back into history to shape the present 
nature of the nationalist movement. Nationalists use symbols and nationalist rhetoric to evoke, 
interpret, and transmit shared memories of pivotal events within the historical narrative of the 
nation, which oftentimes already have a substantial presence in the collective memory of the 
community, and which are easily fitted to embody the desired sense of nationalism and 
national identity that are sought after by nationalists.  
 Our analysis has demonstrated the important role that shared memories and symbols 
play in the development and perpetuation of the nature of a nationalist movement. In the case 
of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, the evocation of key shared memories is 
contextualized in an ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest, reflecting the sentiments of 
historic injustices and struggle to overcome a limitation on socio-economic mobility, which 
was endured by both communities due to the imposition of a linguistically based cultural 
division of labour. More specifically, as a means of perpetuating the vitality of this ethno-
linguistic nationalism of protest, nationalists in Flanders and Québec have relied heavily on 
the evocation, interpretation, and transmission of key shared memories that embody a national 
sense of injustice and struggle. The subsistence of this ethno-linguistic nationalism of protest 
has continually influenced the conception of the national identity in Flanders and in Québec, 
in terms of being nations defined along oppositional ethno-linguistic lines and characterized 
by a sense of injustice and struggle. It is this phenomenon that ultimately accounts for the 
similar nationalist profiles of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, despite 
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differences in their structure and the divergent socio-demographic realities that exist between 
Flanders and Québec.      
 The framework of our historical comparative analysis has proved effective in 
attempting to understand the root causes for the essential character of a contemporary 
nationalist movement. In going beyond a simple linear analysis, where the historical 
development of the nationalist movement is traced moving forward from a set point in time, 
we have established a more comprehensive approach by including the principles of ethno-
symbolism, which call for the study of nations and nationalism (or in our case nationalist 
movements) by analyzing the present and the past with equal weight and measure. In our study 
of the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements, this was achieved by incorporating an 
analysis of the lasting effects of the historic presence of a cultural division of labour, as well as 
taking into account the role of shared memories and symbols, which nationalists evoke as a 
means of reaching back in history to effect the present.  
The framework used in our analysis is potentially useful and applicable elsewhere, 
namely when analyzing and attempting to gain an understanding of the core causes that have 
shaped contemporary nationalist movements. This approach of examining the antecedent 
variables, specifically socio-economic factors, as well as the utilization of shared memories 
and symbols, is imperative in determining the primary causal variables for a nationalist 
movement’s development. The present state of a nationalist movement is not simply the 
product of contemporary influences, as has been exemplified by our comparative historical 
analysis of the nationalist movements in Flanders and Québec. The factors contributing to the 
development and nature of a nationalist movement originate long before the actual inception 
of the nationalist movement itself. Therefore, the study of nationalist movements should not 
be limited to a categorical analysis of defined ethno-cultural, territorial, and socio-economic 
factors. Instead, these factors should be viewed as overlapping in terms of their influence on a 
nationalist movement’s development. 
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Appendix A 
 
IJzertoren (Tower of Yser).
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325 Image Source: Toerisme Diksmuide, http://www.mlnq.org/indexp/pubdrape.gif. 
viii 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Left: Flag of the Flemish Movement.
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 Right: Official flag of Flanders.
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Appendix C 
  
Left: Original flag of les Patriotes during the Lower Canada Rebellions of 1837 and 1838.
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Right: Contemporary adaptation of the flag of les Patriotes, with the addition of a gold star on 
the left corner, and the image of artist Henri Julien’s 1904 drawing “le Vieux de ’37” (see 
below), which depicts a combatant of the 1837 Lower Canada Rebellion.
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“Vieux de ’37” – by Henri Julien in 1904330 
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